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MONETARIST INTERPRETATIONS OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION:
AN EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE
Robert J. Gordon and James A. Wilcox
SUMMARY
The paper examines two different aspects of macroeconomic behavior in
the United States during the period between 1929 and 1941 -- both the proximate
determinants of the severity and duration of the slump in nominal income,
and the factors influencing the division of those changes in nominal income
between changes in the price level and in real output.
The first question, the sources of nominal-income movements, has been
the subject of much recent controversy and debate. the statistical analysis
in the paper suggests that both extreme monetarist and nonmonetarist inter-
pretations of the decade of the 1930s are unsatisfactory and leave interesting
features of the data unexplained. The paper takes the intermediate view that
both monetary and nonmonetary factors were important, and places considerable
emphasis on the interaction among construction, consumption, the stock mar-
ket, and the Hawley-Smoot tariff, in its explanation of the severity of the
first two years of the contraction.
The second section, on the nature of the aggregate supply response in
the 1930s, concludes that neither the equilibrium aggregate supply approach
nor the expectational Phillips curve approach appears at all adequate. The
statistical relation appears to have been between price change and changes
in unemployment or output. The similarity of the supply response in Europe
to that in the U.S. both contradicts those who claim that New Deal legislation
was mainly responsible for the U'.S. price-output pattern, and raises an inter-
esting set of questions for further research.
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91"Explanations which run in terms of one single cause have been more and more
discredited and should be regarded with suspicion" (Haber1er, 1958, p.5).
I. INTRODUCTION
. -- .
During the period between the early 1960's and mid-1970's the Great
Depression received surprisingly little attention from economists. This
fascinating period, the original combat zone which pitted monetarists against
nonmonetarists, seemed until recently a neglected orphan, too young to be
worthy of serious study by economic historians but too old to possess the
easily accessible Commerce Department quarterly national income data which
today's macro-econometricians view as qualifying an era for detailed scrutiny.
Only within the past few years has the orphan grown up sufficiently to attract
the attention of a prominent economic historian, Peter Temin, whose attack
(1976) on the Friedman-Schwartz (1963a) monetary explanation of the Depression
has helped to open up a new round of controversy, including the recent con-
tributions of Meltzer (1976), Mayer (1978a) (1978b), and Schwartz (1978).
A 1fmitation of the Temin book and the subsequent debate has been its
relatively narrow focus on the first two years of the contraction (1929-31)
and on the relation between money and income. As Mayer (1978b) points out, a
study which emphasizes conditions in 1929 and 1930 cannot effectively criticize
the main thrust of the Friedman and Schwartz analysis, which pays scarcely any
attention to the first year of the contraction and concentrates on the period
subsequent to the first wave of bank failures in October, 1930. In a sense
monetarists and their opponents are like two knights in a jousting match who
ride by each other without ever making contact. Monetarists consider virtually
the only interesting question to be the source of the unique depth and severity
of the Depression and naturally concentrate on the 1931-33 phase when the con-
traction exhibited an unprecedented acceleration. The nonmonetarist opponents2
tend to concentrate on the initial decline in private spending which, they
claim, brought the bank failures and monetary collapse in its wake.
This paper rejects the proposition that there is only a single interesting
question to ask about the decade of the 1930's. It is concerned not only with
the role of money in the 1929-33 contraction, but also the relative role of
monetary and nonmonetary factors in the recession of 1937-38 and subsequent
recovery, and in addition with the division of nominal income change between
1/ prices and real output.-- New empirical evidence is provided which bears
~I Outside of the context of the Temin debate, several monetarist
authors have provided important recent interpretations of the price-output
division of nominal income. See especially Meltzer (1977) and Darby (1976b).
on each of these issues.
The results suggest that both extreme monetarist and nonmonetarist inter-
pretations of the decade of the 1930's are unsatisfactory and leave interesting
features of the data unexplained. Arguing against acceptance of an extreme
monetarist interpretation are (1) the inability of changes in the money supply
alone to explain the severity of the initial collapse in income between 1929
and the fall of 1931; (2) the steady weakening of the correlation between
changes in nominal income and money a9 the 1930's progressed; (3) the failure
of monet~ry factors to explain the nature and timing of the 1938-41 recovery;
and (4) the apparent absence of any tendency for the mechanism of price f1ex-
ibility to provide strong self-correcting forces as required by an approach
which stresses monetary rules and opposes policy activism. Arguing against3
acceptance of an extreme nonmonetarist interpretation are (1) the close
association between the collapse in income and the lagged effect of monetary
changes after the fall of 1931; (2) the milder contraction and earlier re-
coveries associated with the more expansive monetary policies pursued in
Europe; (3) the close association between money and income in the 1937-38
recession; and (4) the failure of the price change data to adhere to the
expectational Phillips curve approach imbedded in many postwar econometric
2/ models constructed by nonmonetarists.--
-f/ The primary emphasis in this paper on monetarist interpre-
tations reflects the topic we were assigned by the organizers of the Confer-
ence on the Great Depression, and does not imply any belief on our part that
nonmonetarist interpretations should be immune from detailed scrutiny.
Monetarism and the Central Issues
The debate surrounding monetarist interpretations of the Great Depression
does not center on the potency of monetary changes as a cause of income vari-
ation. Although Some economists in the early 1960's treated the quantity
theory and the Keynesian income-expenditure theory as mutually exclusive
analytical frameworks, from today's vantage point the 1965 '~att1e of the
radio stations" regarding whether money only matters or money never matters
seems quaintly anachronistic ....1/ Recently the monetarist controversy has
been reoriented, as a result of an emerging consensus on both sides that
..1.1 The phrase "battle of the radio stations" comes from the-il
4
(footnote 3 continued)
initials (AM-FM) of the main protagonists in a lOO-page debate published in
1965 in the American Economic Review. See Ando and Modigliani (1965) and
Friedman and Meiselman (1965).
both monetary and nonmonetary factors "matter" for the determination of in-
come (Stein, 1976). Instead, the central issues separating the monetarists
and their opponents include the merits and potential benefits and costs of
government policy activism, both monetary and fiscal, and the stability and
inherent self-correcting properties of the private economy.
This new perspective can be summarized by constructing a "monetarist plat-
form", which brings together in four "planks" the monetarist position on the
remaining areas of disagreement.-il
The development of the monetarist platform benefitted from the
suggestions of Milton Friedman, Allan Meltzer, Franco Modigliani, and Arthur
Okun. It is supported by a more extensive discussion in R. J. Gordon (1978,
pp. 335-43).
Plank 1: Without the interference of demand shocks introduced by
erratic government policy, private spending would be stable, because people
base their consumption plans on a rellltively stable "permanent" concept of in-
come.
Plank 2: Even if private planned spending is not completely stable,
flexible prices create a natural tendency for it to come back on course.-11
5
Plank 3: Even if private planned spending is not completely stable,
and prices are not completely flexible, an activist monetary and fiscal policy
to counteract private demand swings is likely to do more harm than good.
Plank 4: Even if prices are not completely flexible, so that the
economy can wander away from equilibrium in the short run, there can be no
dispute regarding the increased flexibility of prices, the longer the period
of time allowed for adjustment.
From this orientation, a modern monetarist would not be required to devote
excessive attention to showing that money played a major causal role in the
Great Depression, because the potency of money is no longer a matter for
debate.-11 He would be more interested in denying that autonomous swings in
This explains the apparent oddity that the work "money" does
not appear in the platform. Were it not for the popularity of the word
"monetarist" among both economists and journalists, the platform might be
better described by the term "anti-activist."
private spending, not explainable by movements in government policy or in
permanent income, played a major role in the contraction of 1929-33 or in the
subsequent recovery. And he would be particularly concerned with the issue of
price behavior in the 1930's. Did the economy display strong se1f~correcting
forces in the form of flexible prices which would have tended to bring the
economy back to its natural unemployment rate without the need for government
intervention?
This paper is divided into two main sections. The first evaluates the6
relative contributions to nominal income behavior of private spending behavior
and government actions. The central focus is the same question which concerns
both Temin and Schwartz (1978), whether money played no role in the first two
years of the contraction (the Temin position) or whether autonomous private
spending movements played no role (the Schwartz position). But the scope of
our analysis is broader than an evaluation of the Temin-Schwartz debate re-
garding 1929-31, and our purview extends to the whole decade of the 1930's.
The final section of the paper investigates the potency of the economy's
self-correcting mechanism of price flexibility, a pivotal question in the
monetarist controversy, but one which is given no attention at all by Temin,
Schwartz, or most other recent writers. Monetarists not only t~nd to give
greater credence to price flexibility as a source of self-correction in the
private economy, but also to adopt an analytic framework which differs from
that of nonmonetarists.
Monetarists tend to view deviations of output from equilibrium ("natural
output") as being a voluntary response of firms and workers to deviations of
actual prices from their expected level. This "price surprises cause output -- ....
changes" framework is evident both in theoretical writings and in empirical - ~
research.~/ Nonmonetarists, on the other hand, tend to discuss the same
~/ A clear example is Friedman's (1968) statement that "the si-
multaneou8 fall ex poat in real ~ages to employers and rise ex ante in real
wages to employees is what enabled employment to increase." Empirical studies
by Lucas and Rapping (1969), Darby (1976b), and Barro (1977) place unemployment
or real output on the left-hand side of the equation and deviations of nominal7
(footnote 6 continued)
variables from their expected values on the right-hand side. Schwartz (1968,
p. 000) writes in the same vein, lIwhy quantities changed as theydi~-i~r,e-
sponse to price changes should be the goal of analysis" (emphasis added).
problems in terms of a disequilibrium-adjustment framework.-l/ Empirical
In response to a demand shock, prices do not typically adjust
rapidly enough to clear markets, and so agents find themselves constrained by
a level of sales or employment different from what they would voluntarily
choose to supply at going prices and wages (Barro and Grossman, 1976, Chapter
2). Prices and wages are not completely sticky, but rather their adjustment
to excess demand or supply in any given time period is partial rather than in-
stantaneous and complete.
nonmonetarist explanations of wage and price change tend to place deviations
between actual and expected inflation on the left-hand side of the equation
and measures of commodity-market or labor-market disequilibrium on the right-
hand side.--!!l
...§../ R. J. Gordon (1977) presents both wage and price equations with
the coefficient of expectations constrained to be 1.0, thus placing the dif-
ference between actual and expected values on the left-hand side.
The most dramatic recent contribution tending to support the monetarist
belief in self-correction is Darby's (1976b) attempt to remeasure8
unemployment during the Great Depression and show that in the late 1930's un-
employment was rapidly returning to its natural level as agents adjusted the
deviation between actual and expected prices. In this paper we present new
evidence on the relation between prices, expected prices, unemployment, and
output, in an attempt to reassess the potency of the economy's self-correcting
mechanism of price flexibility.
II. MONETARY AND OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF NOMINAL INCOME CHANGE
Distinguishing Hypotheses
Temin's entire book is devoted to an examination of two views, the "money
hypothesis" and the "spending hypothesis." In order to clarify the positions
held by the various protagonists and judge their consistency with the data,
we will distinguish a broader spectrum of four views, ranging from hard-line
monetarism to hard-line anti-monetarism:
(A) "Hard-line monetarism". The 1929-33 contraction was both initiated
and aggravated by monetary factors, and nonmonetary factors played no role.
The prime exponent of this view is Schwartz (1978), who has departed from her
earlier advocacy in Friedman-Schwartz (1963a) of view (B) which admits the
9/ possible role of nonmonetary forces in initiating the contraction.--
-!1../ "A far more satisfactory explanation of 1929-33 than Temin's is
therefore that a series of negative shocks, monetary in origin, reduced real
output. . • . There are no unexplained changes in spending that serve as deus
ex machina•••• The behavior of the economy was determined by public policies.
Different policies would have resulted in different behavior" (1978, pp. 000-000).9
(B) "Soft-line monetarism," the Friedman-Schwartz position. Any com-
bination of factors, both monetary and nonmonetary, could have caused the
initial stage of the contraction through the first wave of bank failures in
late 1930. But from that point bank failures played a crucial role in con-
verting a serious recession into a deep depression. The decline in the stock
of money, while itself aggravated by the severity of the contraction, did not
play a purely passive role but instead worsened the decline in income. As a
result aggressive open-market purchases by the Federal Reserve could have
lessened the severity and duration of the depression. This view differs from
the more extreme position (A) in its explicit admission that the initial phase
of the contraction could have been due to nonmonetary factors, that the money
supply is at least partly endogenous, and that therefore at least part of the
1929-33 decline in the supply of money could have been caused by nonmonetary
10/ factors.-- Following Hicks (1974, p. 210), we may identify this version of
10/ The clearest admission of the possible role of nonmonetary forces
comes in Friedman-Schwartz (1963a, pp. 300-301): "True, as events unfolded,
the decline in the stock of money and the near-collapse of the banking system
can be regarded as a consequence of nonmonetary forces in the United States,
and monetary and nonmonetary forces in the rest of the world. •Prevention
or moderation of the decline in the stock of money, let alone the substitution
of monetary expansion, would have reduced the contractionOs severity and almost
as certainly its duration. The contraction might still have been relatively
severe." On the endogeneity of the money supply, see Friedman-Schwartz (1963b,
pp. 49-50): "The reflex influence of business on money, the existence of
which is not in doubt in light of the factual evidence summarized above, would10
(footnote 10 continued)
then become part of the partly self-generating mechanism whereby monetary
disturbances are transmitted."
soft-line monetarism as the theory of the "double slump," in which a first
phase of a severe depression was followed not by a recovery but by a second
11/ more severe phase caused by monetary factors.--
11/ "The first thing to be said about (the Great Depression) is that
is was a double slump. It began with the Wall street crash in 1929, a repetition,
at least at first sight, of that of 1907, leading to a depression just as that
had done. But the recovery from the depression, which on previous experience
might have been expected to follow within a year or two, did not take place.
Instead there was a double slump, superimposed upon the first. Now there is
no doubt at all that this second slump was monetary in character." Hicks dates
the second stage from the fall of 1931, thus differing from the Friedman-Schwartz
emphasis on the role of bank failures in the fall of 1930.
(C) "Soft-line nonmonetarism." This position emphasizes nonmonetary fac-
tors as sources of the 1929-33 contraction, while not denying the possible role
of money in aggravating the slump. The behavior of housing construction and
international factors are most often emphasized. Bolch and Pilgrim's (1973)
study linking the housing slump to a decline in household formation is an ex-
ample of this genre, and is classified under category (C) because of the ex-
plicit inclusion of monetary factors in individual equations in the modeL11
R. A. Gordon's work (1951, 1974) emph~sizes overinvestment in both housing
12/ and other industries, but does not deny a role for monetary factors.--
In 1974 R. A. Gordon was close enough to the Friedman-Schwartz
position to agree that "vigorous action by the Fed could have substantially
reduced the severity of the depression" (1974, p. 72).
(D) "Hard-line nonmonetarism." Temin's recent work is the most notable
i
example of this extreme view, which was predominant in the 1940's and 1950's,
but which has become increasingly rare since the early 1960's. Temin limits
his advocacy of this extreme view to the interval between October, 1929, and
September, 1931, but within this two-year period his sweeping claim is un-
guarded: "There is no evidence of any effective deflationary pressure from
the banking system between the stock-market crash in October, 1929, and the
British abandonment of the gold standard in September, 1931" (1976, p. 169,
emphasis added).
Since the views labelled (B) and (C) differ only in emphasis, it is i~
possible to distinguish their validity with any degree of precision. Although
their emphasis is very different, Friedman-Schwartz and R. A. Gordon would
probably agree that both bank failures and other nonmonetary factors played at
least some role in the 1929-33 contraction. Since interactions between money
and spending may dominate the effect of either force taken by itself, any
attempt to split up the contraction into the share due to money and the share
due to a particular nonmonetary factor, e.g., housing, is an unproductive
scientific enterprise which is bound to satisfy no one. Instead, the real12
question is whether either extreme view (A) or view (D) can be excluded.
The Temin Claim that Money Didn't Matter at All
The data show that the money supply concept M2 declined by 2.5 percent
during the first four quarters of the contraction and by another 7.9 percent
13/ during the second four quarters.-- For Temin to hold the extreme position
The peak of the cycle was 1929:3.
in the "Notes on Data" at the end of the paper.
Sources of data are identified
(D), he must deny that this decline, whatever its source, had any effect at all
on the level of nominal income. His position is surprising, since it conflicts
with almost all econometric work on postwar data, ranging from the St. Louis
model of Andersen-Jordan (1968), to the reduced-form money-income equations of
Sims (1972) (1977), to the large-scale structural models best represented by
MPS (Ando-Mod1g11an1, 1976).
Temin's case rests on two propositions. First, for the decline in real
output to have been caused by monetary stringency, interest rates should have
been observed to increase. In terms of the classroom IS-LM model, if it is
claimed that IS movements (autonomous shifts in investment and consumption
spending) were unimportant, then the decline in output could only be explained
by a leftward shift in the LM curve, which would have caused interest rates to
increase unless the IS curve were horizontal. But short-term interest rates
on risk-free securities actually exhibited a sharp decline throughout 1929:3
to 1931:3. Second, Temin adds, the position of the LM curve depends on the13
level of real balances, and thus could not have shifted leftward in light of
the increase in real balances which actually occurred through 1931:3.
Figure 1 plots the level of real balances (M2/P) and exhibits the increase
14/ observed by Temin during the interval 1930:2 through 1931:2.--
14/ P is the quarterly GNP deflator. See "Notes on Data."
Temin's defense of view (D) collapses, however, if we can show that the decline
in interest rates and increase in M2/P during 1929-31 are logically consistent
with a model in which nominal spending depends positively on nominal money.
The situation described by solid lines in Figure 2 describes an initial
IS-LM equilibrium. The positive slope of the LM curve reflects a non-zero
interest-elasticity of the demand for money, and its position depends on the
level of real balances (M/P). The negative slope of IS reflects a non-zero
interest-elasticity of investment and/or consumption spending, and its position
depends on the level of "autonomous spending" (A -- exports, government spending,
and the autonomous components of consumption and investment, which in turn depend
partly on tax rates). When the LM and IS curves have the designated slopes, the
aggregate demand curve DD in the bottom frame in P,Q space has a negative
slope and a position which depends on autonomous spending and the nominal
money supply. DD traces the locus of all intersections of IS and LM for given
A and M. So this is a model in which a shift in nominal money shifts the DD
curve and nominal income, and thus is consistent with the positive effects of
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Econometric studies of consumption functions generally support
a real balance effect which makes IS depend on M/P, but this added factor does
not alter our conclusions; it simply makes the DD curve flatter without chang-
ing the variables which cause it to shift its position.
But the model in Figure Z can also easily explain the decline in short-
term interest rates and increase in real balances on which Temin rests his
argument. The necessary ingredient is a drop in the level of autonomous
spending from A O to A 1. If we initially hold constant the level of nominal
money at M O' the IS curve shifts left from ISO to lSI and the aggregate demand
curve shifts left from DDO to DDI • The price level drops from Po to PI' out-
put falls from QO to Q1' and the interest rate drops from rO to r1•
So the movements in the variables all go in the direction noted by Temin,
but nevertheless nominal money does matter. Let nominal money drop from M O to
Ml, and both output and prices will drop further to Q Z and PZ• Because the
aggregate supply curve is positively sloped, rather than vertical, the nrice
level must fall by less than the money supply, ana so M/P must fall ann the
interest rate must rise in situation EZ as comp~red to E
l
• Because the price
level is altered by a change in nominal money, one cannot i1eilllce monetATV im-
potence from movements in real balanceR or interest TRteR. 16/
16/ We belieVE' that Temin was unwise to use IS-1M curves in a problem
involving variable ~rices without also examining the SS-DD diagram sho~m17
(footnote 16 continued)
in the bottom frame of Figure 2. For a full development of this diagrammatic
apparatus, and a discussion of the variables which make SS shift its position,
see R. J. Gordon (1978, pp. 143-198).
Because the argument in Figure 2 relies on a shift in autonomous spending
from AO to AI' it is incompatible with the extreme hard-line monetarist view
(A). In principle the economy could reach point E2 by a different process.
The argument presented in Figure 2 assumes a zero expected rate of deflation.
If in fact the negative 1929-31 rate of change of prices was rapidly incor-
porated into expectations, then the real interest rate would lie above the
nominal interest rate. Because the LM curve is defined for the nominal rate
(on which the demand for real balances depends) and the IS curve is defined
for the real rate, it would be necessary to draw in a second IS curve in terms
of the nominal interest rate. This would be displaced vertically below ISO by
the rate of expected deflation. There is no reason why this lower curve, call
it I~i' could not yield the same intersection point E2 in Figure 2. Thus all
the earlier statements about position E2 would hold, even though autonomous
17/ spending had remained completely constant.--
17/
(1978).
This represents a graphic translation of an argument made by Schwartz
The distinction between nominal and real interest rates is incorporated
into IS-LM analysis in R. J. Gordon (:1978, pp. 289-91).
Yet those who would rely completely on price deflation caused by a18
declining money supply to explain the first year of the 1929-33 contraction--
leaving no room at all for autonomous spending to play a role--surely strain
credulity. Consider the situation in 1930:2. M2 had fallen only 1.8 percent
from its 1929:3 peak. The GNP deflator had declined by only 2.2 percent. In
the entire period between 1921:3 and 1929:3, eight full years, the GNP deflator
varied over a range of only 4.4 percentage points, and the 1929:3 observation
was almost exactly in the middle of the range. Why should economic agents in
the spring of 1930 suddenly have started to expect a deflation substantial
enough to explain the observed decline in nominal interest rates, when actual
price behavior still remained within the range of an eight-year period which
had been characterized by remarkable price stability?
Despite the very small declines in M2 and P over this first three-quarter
period, real output declined by 9.6 percent. Velocity declined by 9.9 per-
cent. 18/ Without a sudden and inexplicable shift from stable price expectations
18/ The inverse of velocity, M2/PQ, is displayed in Figure 1 above.
to expectations of deflation, the first three quarters of the contraction must
be explained by a leftward shift in the IS curve due to a decline in auton-
omous spending. This conclusion is consistent with the more formal simulation
results presented below in Figure 3 and Table 3.19
The expected deflation argument becomes increasingly plausible after the
summer of 1930. In 1930:3 the GNP deflator broke out of the range observed
during the 1920's. By 1931:3 it had declined 13.6 percent below the 1929:3
peak and 11 percent below the lowest value observed in the 1920's. It is not
implausible that expectations of deflation began in late 1930 to shift the IS
curve downward, although in Figure 1 it appears that the decline in velocity
(increase in l/V) was interrupted between 1930:3 and 1931:2. Thus a scenario
which appears consistent with the ratios in Figure 1 would have the initial
three quarters of the contraction explained by a sharp leftward shift of IS
due to a decline in autonomous spending. After 1930:2 the decline in M2 began
in earnest, offsetting the downward pressure on velocity of the continuing IS
shift. After 1931:2 a deflationary spiral began, in which deflationary ex-
pectations shifted down IS, while M2 began falling more rapidly than prices,
thus shifting the LM curve to the left as well. And, as Tobin (1975) has re-
cently reminded us, the depressing impact on expenditures of a price deflation
can include not only upward pressure on the real interest rate and resulting
postponement of spending, but also redistribution toward creditors with low
spending propensities from debtors with high spending propensities.19!
(1933) •
19/ This asp~ct of the Great Depression is emphasized by Fisher20
The Granger Test Results and Extreme Monetarism
So far we have rejected Temin's arguments for view (D) by showing that
the observed facts are consistent with a model in which money influences
spending. However this does not constitute proof that such a model represents
an accurate description of the 1929-33 economy. It is still conceivable that
the observed facts could have been generated by an economy in which money had
no effects on spending, and in which the observed correlation between money
and income was caused by an entirely endogenous and contemporaneous response
of the money supply to bank failures due in turn to the IS-induced weakness of
20/
spending.-
~/ Two channels by which the decline in nominal GNP could have
caused the bank failures are (1) by reducing the nominal sales of individuals
and firms to which banks had lent money, turning initially sound loans into
loans which could not be repaid, and (2) by reducing the prices of bonds, as
securities markets reflected the increased "price of risk", thus contributing
to the insolvency of banks holding risky bonds (Temin, pp. 103-21).
At present the main argument against the extreme position (D) is the con-
sensus among reduced-form and structural econometricians that "money matters"
in the postwar economy. But there is no reason why the same techniques applied
to postwar data cannot be used to analyze interwar data. In a frequently cited
study, Sims (1972) developed a method to test the direction of causation
between money and income and found that he could reject a reverse-feedback
effect of income on money, while he could not reject an impact of lagged money
on income.21
A related method introduced by Granger (1969) involves regressing Yt on a
constant, a time trend, its own lagged values, and lagged values of Xt :
(1) -
Now Y is exogenous with respect to X if the lagged XIS fail to make a significant
contribution to the explanation of Y over and above the influence of the serial
correlation process in Y captured by the lagged values of y.~1
Schwartz (1978) has independently used the Granger method to
evaluate the Temin interpretation of the 1929-33 contraction. While our results
are consistent with hers in rejecting Temin's extreme position (D), we go be-
yond her results by running simulations which tend to reject her own extreme
position (A).
Table 1 displays the results of the estimation of equation (1) and con-
tains two sections, each with four lines. Within each section the four regres-
s10ns consist of one pair with nominal GNP as dependent variable and Ml and M2
alternatively as independent variables, and another pair with the two money
concepts as alternative dependent variables. Section A defines each variable
in its level form, while section B defines each variable as a one-quarter rate
of change. Table 1 reports the results for quarterly data estimated for the
period 1920:2 to 1941:4, and two sUbperiods.~1 Table 2 reports analogous
22./ In Table 1 K=4 and L-8 when money is the independent variable22
(footnote 22 continued)
and L=4 when income is the independent variable. This difference in the
value of L occurs because quarterly income data are not available before
1919, and we were urged by a discussant to start our sample period in 1920:2
in order to capture the relation between money and income in the 1920-21
recession.
results for monthly data using M2 and two proxies for aggregate nominal activity,
23/ nominal industrial production and an index of nominal department store sa1es.·--
In Table 2 K = L = 8. Inclusion of extra lagged values beyond
eight yielded insignificant coefficients and did not alter the results dis-
played in Table 2.
Turning first to Table 1, the first three columns report F tests on the
significance of the lagged independent variables. Lagged nominal income has
no significant feedback effect on either M1 or M2, though its impact on both
approaches significance in growth-rate form in the 1920-28 subperiod. Thus
the endogeneity of money, upon which Temin rests much of his argument, is not
evident in the form of an impact of lagged income on money in quarterly data
for either the 1929-41 subperiod, or the complete 1920-41 period. However a
current ~ffect of income on money, as we shall see, is an important feature of
these periods.
Lagged money has an ambiguous effect on income. In the level equations
(section A of Table 1) there is a very significant impact for the overall periodTable 1
GRANGER TEST RESULTS, QUARTERLY DATA,
1920:2-1941:4 AND SUBPERIODS
23
Variables F Ratio for Signi£-
Depen- Inde- icartce bf Laggedx's t Ratio on Current X
~ent (Y) pendent (X) 1920..;,41 ,~1920";'28 1929-41 1920-41 1920-28 1929-41
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Levels Y M1 2.68** 1.75 1.50 4.17** 1.62* 4.60**
Ml Y 1.10 0.85 0.38 4.17** 1.62* 4.60**
y M2 3.95** 1.78 1.43 5.57** 0.78 4.95**
M2 Y 0.38 0.76 0.43 5.57** 0.78 4.95**
B. Growth Rates Y M1 2.21** 2.81** 1.15 3.97** 0.46 3.25**
Ml Y 0.63 1.68 0.10 3.97** 0.46 3.25**
y M2 2.42** 3.06** 1.69 4.85** 0.18 3.71**
M2 Y 0.45 1.35 0.42 4.85** 0.18 3.71**
Note: * indicates significant at 10 percent level.
** indicates significant at 5 percent level.24
but not for either of the subperiods. In rate-of-growth form the significance
levels increase substantially for 1920-28 but fall for 1920-41. There is an
insignificant impact on income during 1929-41 for both Ml and M2, just as
in the level form of the equations.
The three right-hand columns of Table 1 report t ratios for current values
of the independent variables. By far the most important characteristic of the
1929-41 period is the simultaneity of movements in money and income. Schwartz
could claim that within the current quarter money has a very rapid and powerful
positive effect on nominal GNP, while Temin could claim that within the current
quarter money is responding passively to changes in GNP caused by nonmonetary
factors.
The next step, in light of simultaneity for the 1929-41 subperiod, is to
look inside the contemporaneous quarter by examining results for monthly data
in Table 2. Once again we find no influence of the lagged income proxies on
money, while lagged M2 does appear to have a significant influence on indus-
trial production (although not on retail sales). Once again there is a strong
contemporaneous relation within the current month which could go either way,
and so still it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that there is signi-
ficant feedback from income to money within the current month. In light of the
impact of lagged money on industrial production and the consequent rejection
of view (D), however, nothing important depends on our inability to untangle
the direction of causation within the current month. Certainly proponents of
the middle-ground views (B) and (C) can feel comfortable with an instantaneous
feedback from income to money, described by Friedman and Schwartz (1963b, p.
49) as "the reflex influence of business on money, the existence of which is





Depen- Inde- F Ratio for Signif-
dent (Y) pendent (X) icance of Lagged X's t Ratio on Current X
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. t.e\rels lPC M2 3.26** 3.20**
M2 lPC 1.12 3.20**
S M2 1.17 3.24**
M2 S 0.92 3.24**
B. Growth Rates lPC M2 3.26** 3.64**
M2 IPC 1.40 3.64**
S M2 0.83 2.98** '
M2 S 1.04 2.98**
Note: 1. ** indicntes significant at 5 percent level.
2. All data are seasonally adjusted.
3. S is an index of department store sales published by
the Federal Reserve Board.
4. lPC is the Federal Reserve Board's index of industrial
production multiplied by the CPl.26
The Dynamic Simulations and Extreme Monetarism
It is one thing for us to reject the extreme nonmonetarist claim that
money did not matter at all, but it is quite another for an extreme monetarist
to argue that "only money matters," and that there are "no unexplained changes
in spending that serve as deus ex machina" after accounting for a series of
"negative shocks, monetary in origin" (Schwartz, 1978, pp. 000-00). Sim-
ilarly, Darby (1976a) asserts that the first stage of the contraction was en-
tirely monetary in origin:
"The contraction began, in fact, during the sununer of 1929,
as the decline in fluidity due to the initial monetary shock
slowed and reversed. This early part of the contraction from
1929 to 1930 was in no way different from the sharp recession
that would be expected from a 6 percent decrease in the money-
supply growth rate" (p. 239).
A possible method to test the Darby-Schwartz proposition about the mon-
etary origin of the contraction 1s to use the average statistical relation
between lagged money and income during the 1920-28 interval, during which
there were three separate recessions to establish what might be expected to
follow a deceleration in the growth rate of the money supply. Can the first
year or two of the contraction be attributed in its entirety or in part to the
prior monetary deceleration? In this section we report the results of a
dynamic simulation in which equation (1) is estimated for the period 1920:2
through 1928:4 with income as dependent variable and lagged income and money
as right-hand variables, and then the predicted behavior of income is calcu-
lated based on the fitted coefficients.27
A number of possible variants of the dynamic simulation could be presented,
corresponding to the different lines in Table 1. The monetary definition could
be Ml or M2, and the variables could be in the form of levels or rates of change.
To economize on space only one version is presented, based on the level form
with the M2 definition of money, because this simulation is most favorable to
the hypothesis (A) that monetary shocks were solely responsible for the con-
traction. The M2 variant in level form is more favorable both because M2 fell
relatively more than Ml during the contraction, and also because the pattern
of coefficients during the sample period for the M2 level variant yields a
1 d 24/ greater simu ate contraction in income.--
241 Between 1929:3 and 1933:2 Ml fell by 31.8 percent, and M2 fell
by 35.1 percent. The sums of coefficients on lagged money in the 1920-28









In Figure 3 arid Table 3 the actual values of nominal income are compared
with the values of Yt calculated as
(2) - + +
4 ,.. ,..
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The "hatted" coefficients are those estimated from equation (1) for the sample
period 1920:2 to 1928:4. The Xt_
j are the actual values of lagged M2 and Yt- i














SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS







Lagged ($ Billions) ($ Billions)
Actual Mo~ey from line A from line above
Yt Yt Yt ~t (4)/(3) Yt
y (7)/(6) t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Peak Level (29:3) 106.0 98.8
B. Half Years
1. 29:4-30:1 100.0 98.8 -6.0 0.0 0.0 -6.0 0.0 0.0
2. 30:2-30:3 91.3 96.2 -14.7 -2.6 17.7 -8.7 -2.6 29.9
3. 30:4-31:1 84.9 93.5 -21.1 -5.3 25.1 -6.4 -2.7 42.2
4. 31:2-31:3 79.5 92.0 -26.5 -6.8 25.7 -5.4 -1.5 27.8
5. 31:4-32:1 67.9 84.6 -38.1 -14.2 37.3 -11.6 -7.4 63.8
6. 32:2-32:3 57.2 70.9 -48.8 -27.9 57.2 -10.7 -13.7 128.0
7. 32:4-33:1 51.8 72.4 -54.2 -26.4 48.7 -5.4 1.5 -27.8
8. 33:2-33:3 58.5 71.0 -47.5 -27.8 58.5 6.7 -1.4 -20.9
Source: Figure 330
earlier, and are the values calculated in (2) after 1928:4.
The differences between actual (Yt) and simulated (Yt ) nomin-al-incrnue
presented in Figure 3 must be interpreted carefully. Yt measures the estimated
contribution to the behavior of Yt of the actual behavior of lagged M2, given
the structural relation between lagged M2 and Yt present in the 1920-28 data.
The values of lagged M2 fed into the dynamic simulations are the actual his-
torical values. To the extent that money was partly endogenous, and the ob-
served decline in M2 during the contraction partially reflects the contem-
poraneous influence of nonmonetary factors on income, Yt would tend to ex-
aggerate the contribution of exogenous monetary factors.
On the other hand, monetarists may object to the limitation of the in-
fluence of money to a lagged effect. To the extent that the contemporaneous
correlation of money and income represents the money-to-income channel of
causation, the exclusion of the current money supply understates the contri-
bution of monetary change. But the addition of current money, somewhat sur-
pr1singly, actually dampens the 1929-33 decline in the simulated income series,
because the coefficient on current money in the 1920-28 income regression is
a small and insignificant negative number.
How well does the lagged-money simulation explain the great contraction?
Figure 3 indicates that Yt consistently lies above the actual value of nominal
GNP (Y
t
). Dividing up the 1929-33 contraction into two-quarter intervals to
facilitate analysis, we can examine the averages presented in Table 3.
According to the Hicks theory of the "double slump" we should find that the
simulation based on lagged-money (Y ) explains only a portion of the actual
t
slump in Yt during the first two years of the contraction, but that then mon-
etary forces take over and account for most of the decline in Y. According
t31
to Friedman-Schwartz, the contraction changed its character one year earlier,
at the time of the first wave of bank failures during the last quarter of
A
1930. According to Darby-Schwartz, the Yt series should trace the 1929-31
decline in Yt quite closely.
Both the contribution of money to the cumulative change in Yt in column
(5), and the contribution to the marginal change from one-half-year to the
next in column (9), are more consistent with the Hicks timing than the
Friedman-Schwartz timing, and are not consistent at all with the Darby-Schwartz
money-only explanation. Between line A and line B2 money contributes 17.7 per-
cent of the total decline in income; on line B4 the cumulative contribution
rises only to 25.7 percent. And the marginal contribution on line B4 is only
27.8 percent. In contrast there is a dramatic change beginning on line B5,
where the marginal cont~ibution of money jumps to 63.8 percent, and to more
than 100 percent on line B6. Although a subsequent zig-zag causes the simu-
lated Yt series to miss the timing of the last stage of the contraction in late
1932 and early 1933, nevertheless the cumulative contribution of Yt to the
actual decline in Yt remains in the vicinity of 50 percent in lines B6 through
B8.
As we have seen, both Darby and Schwartz have pointed to slow monetary
growth in 1928 and early 1929 as the fundamental underlying cause of the first
year of the contraction. 'Indeed between 1928:1 and 1929:3 M2 grew by only 0.6
percent at an annual rate in contrast to a rate of 5.2 percent in the preceding
five quarters. But even greater decelerations of monetary growth had happened
before without causing a drastic drop in nominal income. For instance, while
the growth of M2 slowed from an annual rate of 8.9 percent in the seven quar-
ters preceding 1925:4 to a 0.5 rate in the next four quarters, the subsequent f32
decline in nominal income between peak and through in the 1927 recession was
only 2.8 percent.
"-
Thus the simulated value Y , which combines the average
t
relation between lagged money and income observed during the 1920's with the
actual behavior of money during 1929-33, essentially says "though monetary
growth decelerated in 1928 and 1929, such a monetary slowdown had happened
before and can only account for 18 percent of the observed decline in nominal
income in the first year of the contraction and 26 percent cumulatively in the
first two years."
The 1937-38 Recession and Subsequent Recovery
Monetarist interpretations of the Great Depression are not limited to the
1929-33 contraction phase. In addition, monetarists have long taken the
position that the proximate cause of the 1937-38 recession was the three-stage
doubling of reserve requirements between August, 1936 and May, 1937. The same
simulation technique can be used to evaluate the validity of this claim. The
technique is exactly the same as in the preceding discussion, except that two
different simulation results are reported. The first is based on the money-
income equation fitted to the 1920-28 period which is used in the simulations
in Figure 3 and Table 3. As is evident in Table 4 and Figure 4, the value of
Yt calculated fronl the dynamic simulation which starts in 1929:1 remains above
the actual value of Yt throughout the 1937-41 period. Nevertheless, Yt declines
between the peak quarter (1937:2) and early 1938 by almost as much as actual
inconle. In short, the simulation based on the 1920-28 coefficients implies
that the 1937-38 recession was almost entirely a monetary· phenomenon.
A second simulation is based on the same specification extended to the























SUMMARY OF SIMULATION RESULTS







Lagged ($ Billions) ($ Billions)
Actual Money from Peak from line above
" " *
~ " " Yt Y,Y Y Y ,Y (4)/(3) Yt Yt , Yt (7)/(6) t t t t t
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A. Simulation based
" on 1920-28 (Y)
1. Peak, 37:2 93.7 110.5
2. 38:1-38:2 83.5 101.2 -10.2 -9.3 91.1 -10.2 -9.3 91.1
3. 40:1-40:2 96.1 120.6 2.4 10.1 420.8 12.6 19.4 154.0
4. 41:3-41:4 131.7 140:3 38.0 29.8 78.4 35.6 19.7 55.3
B. Simulation based
on 1920-36 d,
1. Peak, 37:2 93.7 88.8
2. 38:1-38:2 83.5 81.9 -10.2 -6.9 67.6 -10.2 -6.9 67.6
3. 40:1-40:2 96.1 103.7 2.4 14.9 620.8 12.6 21.8 173.0
4. 41:3-41:4 131.7 121.4 38.0 32.6 85.8 35.6 17.7 49.7_
Source: Figures 4 and 535 ,. ,.
recession concur in the verdict that the simulated Yt series explains most of
the downturn in Yt , 68 percent in this case as compared to 91 percent for the
first simulation. ,. ,.
Although the simulated series Yt and Yt indicate that most of the 1937-38
recession can be explained as a consequence of the behavior of lagged money
and lagged income, nevertheless the ability of the two simulated series to
track actual income deteriorates markedly after early 1938. As indicated in
both Table 4 and Figures 4 and 5, the simulated series recover much more mar-
kedly than actual Yt between the first half of 1938 and the first half of 1940.
In the latter interval actual nominal income had exceeded the 1937 peak by
only $2.4 billion, or 2.6 percent. ,. ,.
But the Yt series had grown by 9.1 percent
and Yt by 16.8 percent.
After the first half of 1940 the relationship between the actual and si~
ulated series shifted in the direction of rapid actual growth relative to si~
ulated growth. Only about half of the actual growth in nominal income between
the first half of 1940 and the last half of 1941 can be explained by the growth
of lagged money and income. These results appear consistent with a model of
income determination in which shifts in private investment and government ex-
penditures play an important role, given the behavior of money. Private in-
vestment was sluggish during the interval 1937-40, leading to a weak recovery
25/ despite the rapid growth in M2 which was occurring.--
Nonresidential fixed investment in 1940 was exactly the same as
in 1937 in real terms, and grew only 3 pereeat,in nominal terms, whereas nominal
M2 grew 18.5 percent between 1937:2 and 1940:2.36
Then, after mid-1940, rapid growth in government defense spending shifted the
IS curve rapidly rightwards and caused an accelerated growth in income without
any acceleration in the growth rate of money.2£/
261 Between 1940 and 1941 nominal defense spending grew by an amount
equal to 11.5 percent of 1940 nominal GNP. The annual growth rate of M2 in
the six quarters after 1940:2 (12.2 percent) was little different than in the
six quarters before 1940:2 (11.0 percent).
Our interpretation is that shifts in the IS curve must be relied upon to
explain the timing of income growth in the 1938-41 period, just as IS shifts
appear to have dominated the explanation of income change in the first two years
of the great contraction, 1929:3 through 1931:3. This suggests a puzzle.
Given the weak impetus to spending provided by the monetary acceleration of 1938-
40, why should the monetary deceleration of early 1937 have been so potent?
One answer is that monetary tightness per se was not particularly potent, and
instead the 1937-38 recession was due at least partly to nonmonetary factors.
One candidate which stands out is the increase between 1936 and 1937 in the full
employment federal surplus equal to fully 3 percent of GNP (equivalent to a
$60 billion fiscal swing in today's economy).~/
E/ For sources and data see Gordon (1978, p. 496).37
Implications of the Regressions and Simulations
Several additional questions can be raised concerning the regression and
simulation results.
First, do the 1929-33 and 1937-38 downturns in the simulated series Yt
('0
and Yt reflect just the lagged effect of the decline in money, or is part of
the decline contributed by the lagged income variables? We have examined
separate simulations based on regressions in which lagged values of money are
excluded, in order to study the post-sample predictions based solely on the
autoregressive structure of the income variable. There is a minor cycle in
the growth rate of income in such a dynamic autoregressive simulation, but no
actual decline in the level of income during the 1929-33 or 1937-38 periods.
Thus it appears that all of the decline in the simulated series in Figures 3,
4, and 5 is being contributed by the lagged effect of money and none by the
lagged income variables.
Second, is the failure of the simulated series to capture fully the actual
1929-33 decline in income in Figure 3 due in any part to the inclusion of a
time trend in the original regression equation (1)? The results of alternative
simulations based on regressions without time trends can be summarized by
showing the contribution of the simulated series to the actual cumulative
change by the two alternative methods of estimation:
With Trend Without Trend
Table 3, Peak to 31:2/31:3 25.7 % 31.3 %
Table 3, Peak to 32:4/33:1 48.7 57.6
Table 4, Peak to 38:1/38:2 (Line A) 91.1 95.1
Table 4, Peak to 38:1/38:2 (Line B) 67.6 22.538
Thus the omission of the time trend variable does increase by a minor amount
the contribution of lagged money to an explanation of the 1929-33 and 1937-38
contractions based on the 1920-28 regressions where the time trend is positive.
Butt the same omission substantially reduces the contribution of lagged money
to an explanation of the 1937-38 contraction based on the 1920-36 regressions
where the time trend is negative.
Third, why is there such a difference in the contribution of lagged money
to an explanation of the 1937-38 contraction between the two sets of simu-
lations based on the alternative 1920-28 and 1920-36 sample periods? There
are very substantial shifts in the coefficients of these reduced-form regres-
sion equations when the sample period is altered. Table 5 exhibits the shifts
in coefficients on lagged and current money in alternative overlapping eight-
year sample periods. There appears to be an inverse correlation between the
sum of coefficients on lagged money in column (1), which is greatest in the
first three lines, and the coefficient on current money in column (3), which
is much larger in the last four lines than in the first three. Thus the re-
lation between money and incomeK~ypears to have shifted to a mainly contem-
poraneous one in the 1930's, with a substantial lagged effect of money on in-
come evident only in the earlier periods.
The results in Table 5 cast additional doubt on the hypothesis that
changes in the money supply were primarily responsible for the behavior of in-
come in the Great Depression. In all of the subperiods in Table 5 the t-ratio
on the sum of lagged coefficients is extremely small. Although some individual
coefficients are significant, they tend to alternate in sign. The dominance
of the contemporaneous correlation in the decade of the 1930's adds plausibility
to the reverse feedback hypothesis that the reflex effect of business on money39
Table 5
EFFECT OF LAGGED AND CURRENT MONEY
ON INCOME IN ALTERNATIVE EIGHT-YEAR
SAMPLE PERIODS, 1920-40, QUARTERLY DATA
Saa!p1e Periods
Lagged Money




(1) (2) (3) (4)
1. 1920:2 - 1928:4 0.936 0.~15 -1.118 -0.77
2. 1922:1 - 1930:4 1.405 0.27 0.289 0.21
3. 1924:1 - 1932:4 1.249 0.19 0.871 1.16
4. 1926:1 - 1934:4 0.262 0.05 2.357 2.77
5. 1928:1 - 1936:4 0.628 0.12 3.083 3.47
6. 1930:1 - 1938:4 0.413 0.07 3.938 6.05
7. 1932:1 - 1940:4 0.595 0.12 2.748 3.1140
was a primary determinant of shifts in the money supply. Further, it is
awkward for monetarists to rely upon an entirely contemporaneous money-to-
income effect to support their case, because long lags between policy changes
----- ----and-income changes play an important part in their argument against counter-
28/
cyclical activism in Plank 3 of the monetarist platform.-
~/ In the case of the regressions in which the variables are in the
form of growth rates, the sums of coefficients on lagged money are almost always
negative and are never significantly different from zero. Also, the F ratio on the
significance of lagged M2 growth rates declines appreciably as the sample moves
through the 1930's.
It is important, however, to distinguish between hypothesis (1) that ob-
served movements in the money supply during the 1930's were largely passive and
endogenous from hypothesis (2) that an alternative monetary policy which sub-
stituted active countercyclical open-market operations could have lessened the
severity of the contraction and brought about an earlier and more robust re-
covery. Both hypotheses (1) and (2) could be correct but hypothesis (2) can-
not be tested on data from the period if hypothesis (1) is correct as well.
Coefficients would have shifted, as the work of Robert Lucas (1976) suggests,
if an activist monetary policy had been pursued. For this reason econometric
studies of U.S. money and income data are unlikely to settle the debate re-
garding the potential role of alternative monetary policies, however much they
may indicate that the lagged changes in monetary growth which actually did occur
are capable of explaining little if any of the.fluctuations in income in the decade
of the 1930's.41
A comparison of the U.S. with Europe, where both money and income followed
quite different paths after the devaluation of sterling in the fall of 1931,
helps to overcome the inherent limitations of the U.S. data. In Figure 6 the
European data exhibit a dramatic divergence from the U.S. behavior of money
29/ and income after 1931.--
Pi..! The European data refer to the total of France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom aggregated with weights according
to 1929 GNP in dollars. Sources are described in the data appendix.
Some of this difference may represent nonmonetary factors which raised in-
come and pulled up the money supply through a reverse feedback mechanism, e.g.,
the stimulus of the 1931 devaluation in several European countries and the im-
pact on income of activist fiscal stimuli (especially in Germany beginning in
1933). But some of the explanation for the earlier European recovery may rest
\
on activist monetary policy, as described for Sweden by Jonung (1978), lending
some credence to Schwartz's (1978) statement that "different policies would
have resulted in different behavior."
The comparison between European and U.S. velocity in the bottom frame of
Figure 6 reveals some interesting similarities and differences. The simultaneous
sharp decline during 1929-32 suggests the presence of a common nonmonetary shift
factor. The fact that European velocity declined less than that in the U.S. is
not consistent with the predictions of an ordinary IS-LM model, given the less
restrictive monetary policy pursued in Europe. Finally, the decline in velocity
in the U.S. in 1939 and 1940, and in Europe in 1938, is consistent with theFIGURE 6.
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hypothesis that the 1M curve is positively sloped but does not constitute a
demonstration that it is horizontal. In short, the comparison in Figure 6 is
consistent with the basic themes of this paper that both monetary and non-
monetary factors mattered, that nonmonetary factors were of prime importance
during 1929-31, that different monetary policies in the u.s. after 1931 would
have reduced the severity of the contraction, and finally that the stimulus of
rapid monetary growth on economic activity in the late 1930's was quite weak.
III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF NONMONETARY FACTORS
Searching for Nonmonetary Explanations
It is easier to show that nonmonetary factors must have been at work in
the first two years of the contraction than to determine what those factors
were, much less to assign specific quantitative contributions to each of them.
MOst recent discussions of nonmonetary factors have suffered from three
methodological weaknesses, which we may label "monocausal blinders", the
"endogeneity fallacy", and "postwar second-guessing." An analyst wears mono-
causal blinders when he claims that factor X could not have possibly been the
cause of the contraction because it was not quantitatively important enough, or
it happened at the wrong time. For instance, "the fall of construction in the
'''-)f/ late 1920's was deflationary, but too small to precipitate a major depression." ~
Temin (1976, p. 68).
"Construction spending peaked in 1926," some might say, "so if construction
spending was the cause, why did the Great Depression not begin in 1927?" This
ignores the possibility that there may have been several causes and timing44
patterns. Imagine that there were two causes, Xl (construction) which con-
tinuously exerted a downward influence on nominal spending after 1926, and X2
(say the stock market) which exerted an expansionary influence in 1928 and
early 1929 and a contractionary influence after mid-1929. The fact that the
economy slumped in late 1929 rather than early 1927 does not deny that cause
Xl made the post-1929 contraction more severe than otherwise. In the same way,
Table 3 indicates that in the early quarters of 1930, the decline in the money
supply probably made the contraction more severe, even if money alone can
account for only a fraction of the total decline in spending. As the decline
in Yt fed into investment planning, it in turn made investment decline more
rapidly than otherwise.
An analyst suffers from the "endogeneity fallacy" when he dismisses Xl as
a possible cause because it is "endogenous and declined because income declined."
For instance, Temin writes (1976, p. 66) "•••the major part of the fall in con-
struction in the 1930's can best be seen as the result of the fall in income
rather than as the result of a change in some alternative variable." Thus, the
construction hypothesis is abruptly dismissed. Similarly money is dismissed as
a cause by Temin because the bank failures which were primarily responsible for
the decline in the stock of money are viewed as an endogenous response to the
decline in income. But this cavalier approach neglects the possibilitY of inter-
actions among a number of possible causes. an interaction of which Friedman-Schwartz
(1963b, p.SO) were well aware when they wrote that the endo~eneitY of money was
"part of the partly self-generating mechanism whereby monetary disturbances are
transmitted." In the same way the endogeneity of construction. which is influenced
by income on which the desired stock of structures depends, but which at the same
time is part of GNP, is part of the "partly self-generating mechanism whereby45
. ~onetary disturbances are transmitted."
Finally, "postwar second-guessing" occurs when an analyst claims that Xl
could .not have been a cause of the 1929-33 contraction, because slumps in Xl
have been observed to occur in the postwar years without resulting in a Great
Depression. This ignores possible differences in factors other than Xl which
may have served to insulate the economy from the effects of the Xl slump. More
formally, this point may be made in terms of the national income identity:
(3) S - I + D + F,
where S is gross saving, I is gross investment, D is the government deficit,
and F is the foreign trade surplus. Dividing both sides by "full-employment"
or "natural-employment" output (Q*), and designating the ratio of gross saving
to actual output (Q) as s (=S/Q), we have:
(4) ~
Q*
Imagine; for the sake of argument, that the gross saving ratio ~ is roughly
fixed. If there is a decline in the ratio of gross domestic investment to
natural output (I/Q*), then the economy must adjust in some way, either by an
offsetting shift in the natural-output government deficit (D/Q*) or in the
natural-output trade surplus (F/Q*) on the right-hand side of the equation, or
in a contraction in the output ratio Q/Q* on the left-hand side.
In the postwar period there have been repeated multi-year booms and slumps
in the I/Q* ratio. To some extent these have been offset by the willingness of
the Federal government to incur budget deficits, but nevertheless their impact
has not been entirely offset and the economy has adjusted by experiencing pro-46
longed periods of persistent above-average or below-average unemployment.~/
As examples, the ratio of real fixed gross investment to Q* was
.144 in 1955-57, .130 in 1958-61, .150 in 1965-69, and .124 in 1975-77.
The absence of a depression in the postwar period is a testimony to (a) potent
built-in stabilizers and (b) monetary policy, which aggravated cycles in the
short run by allowing procyclical slumps in money at the beginning of recessions,
but nevertheless managed to get money growing again after a quarter or two. It
is not inconsistent to say that the actual behavior of investment in 1929-31
would have caused only a 1958- or 1975-size recession had it been accompanied
by postwar-size built-in stabilizers and postwar monetary policy, and at the
same time to say that the behavior of investment caused a much more serious
contraction in the 1930's, given the smaller built-in stabilizers and the en-
32/ dogenous procyclical monetary policy conducted by the Fed.-- Put another way,
321 Hickman-Coen (1976, p. 194) estimate a multiplier for changes in
real autonomous spending (for five years after the change) of 5.09 under the
conditions of 1926-40 and only 2.10 under the conditions of 1951-65. R. J.
Gordon (1978, p. 494) calculates that the automatic fiscal stabilizers absorbed
only 5.5 percent of the decline in GNP in 1932, but 36.9 percent in 1975.
one can simultaneously claim that the contraction was a nonmonetary phenomenon
in origin, but monetary as well in the sense that the actual monetary policy
aggravated the slump and an alternative expansionary monetary policy would have47
moderated it. One can agree with Schwartz (1978, p. 000) that "different
policies would have resulted in different behavior" and simultaneously dis-
agree with her statement that Ut4Rs are no unexplained changes in spending
·.lii,·
that serve as deus ex machina."
In searching for the nature of the nonmonetary deus ex machina, we do not
imply that money did not also play an important role, particularly in the 1931-
33 phase of the contraction. But we reject the contention that there is only
one "main question" to be answered about the contraction, why it was so severe
33/ and "why recovery was so slow in coming."~ An episode as dramatic as the
33/ Mayer (1978b, p. 130).
contraction is capable of raising more than a single issue. While monetarists
may be content to limit their analysis to a demonstration that inept monetary
policy explains the unique magnitude of the contraction, we find equally inter-
esting a search for nonmonetary forces which appear to have been primarily
responsible for the 28 percent decline in nominal income in the interval
1929:3-1931:3. and which in turn must have played at least some role in causing
the bank failures which the Fed failed to counteract.3~/
34/ Meltzer himself shows that industrial production had already
fallen by 25 percent at the time of the first wave of bank failures in October,
1930 (1976,p. 464).
Just as there can be more than a single "main question" of interest48
suggested by the 1929-33 experience, so there may have been more than a single
nonmonetary explanation of the severity of the decline in income during the
1929-31 phase. Several possible explanations share the common theme that any
excess of spending breeds its own self-correcting contraction. Many authors
have constructed business cycle models based on the interaction of the multi-
plier and the accelerator. In Goodwin's (1955) model the expansion phase is
eventually terminated by supply constraints, which slow the growth of the
capital stock and hence the level of net investment:
"[The economy] is always straining to get to the
full employment limit, but by the mere fact of
being there for a time, it is projected downward
again (Goodwin, 1955, p. 209).
Our explanation can be summarized within the flexible aceelerator frame-
work as follows:
1. Net investment in both consumer and producer goods is a function
of the deviation between the desired and actual stocks of those goods.
2. A decline in net investment can occur when there is a decline
in the desired stockt or,
3. When something has occurred in the past to raise the current
stock too high relative to today's desired stock.
4. Within the framework of the identity (4) above, any such decline
in net investment will cause a decline in the output ratio (Q/Q*) unless offset
by a decline in the saving ratio, thp natural-employment government deficit t or
the natural-employment trade surplus.
5. The major factor which reduced the desired capital stock was the
effect of declining population growth on residential housing.49
6. The major factors which raised the actual capital stock too
high were the overbuilding of residential housing in the mid-1920's and the
effect on consumer spending of the overshooting of the stock market during its
1928-29 speculative bubble.
Construction
In a recent paper Hickman (1973) has documented both the effect of the
decline in population growth on the desired housing stock, and also the extent
of overbuilding in the mid-1920's. Hickman's model of the residential housing
sector improves on previous work by treating the rate of population growth as
endogenous, due to the effect of income on the rate at which individuals in
various age groups choose to form households. Hickman is able to decompose
the observed decline in the rate of population growth between the early 1920's
and mid-1930's into two components, that due to the effect of declining income,
and a remaining exogenous decline in "standardized households" due primarily to
35/
the decline in immigration.--
"Standardized households" are calculated by applying fixed 1940
household-headship rates to each age group. Since headship rates among children
are negligible, the endogenous decline in the birth rate caused by the drop in
income during the depression could not have altered the number of standardized
households in the 1929-41 period.
In order to isolate the effect of the exogenous component of the decline
in household formation, Hickman calculated two dynamic simulations of his model,50
one in which standardized households are assumed to increase steadily at the
1924-25 rate of growth, and another in which income and other economic vari-
abIes are identical but in which standardized households follow their actual
declining growth path after 1925. The impact of the actual demographic slump
gradually becomes more important as the 1930's progress, accounting for a
decline in housing starts between the two simulations of 28.3 percent for the
36/ year 1933 and 39.1 percent for the year 1940.--
~/ See Hickman's presentation (1973, Table 3, p. 307) of results
for each year both for simulation II (standardized households growth at 1924-
25 rate) and simulation III (standardized households follow actual path).
Temin's summary of this same paper (1976, pp. 46-47) states that "holding in-
come constant in this model eliminates most of the fall in construction in the
1930's by eliminating the observed fall in the rate of family formation in that
decade." But Hickman's simulation III which holds income constant while
allowing standardized households to follow their actual path does not eliminate
the observed fall in the rate of household formation (in Simulation III the
rate of household fbrmation falls from 579 million in 1925 to a trough of 377
million in 1937, for a decline of 34.9 percent). Nor is most of the decline
in construction eliminated, since housing starts fall in simulation III from
977 million in 1925 to 372 million in 1940, for a decline of 61.9 percent.
It has been suggested that the effect of declining immigration on the de-
sired capital stock of residential housing could not be a contributing factor
to a worldwide depression. Such a change in immigration patterns, the argument51
runs, would reduce the demand for housing in the U.S. but raise the demand for
housing in the former source countries, e.g., Italy and Poland. But this po-
sition is flawed for several reasons. First, many of the immigrants came from
rural areas where their departure led to housing abandonment. A lower immi-
gration flow would reduce the demand for housing in the U.S., but to a large
extent reduce the rate of abandonment in Italy and Poland, rather than stim-
ulate new construction. Second, the marginal product of U.S. immigrants in-
stantly increased upon arrival as compared to their previous situation because
of the much greater amount of physical capital available in the U.S. Third,
there is a long oral tradition in labor economics which claims that increases
in immigration led to an expansion in the demand for all types of reproducible
capital goods, not just residential housing. Immigrants initially hold a pro-
portionately greater share of their non-human wealth in liquid capital, partie-
ularly gold and jewelry, but after some period of adjustment to their new en-
37 I
vironment this liquid wealth is converted into physical capital.--
I!./ The oral tradition was passed on to us by George R. Neumann, to
whom we are indebted.
But the deflationary impact of demography is only the first of the two i~
portant causes of the housing problem. The second was the extent of over-
building in the mid-1920's. For six years (1923-28) real residential con-
struction achieved a level more than double the average of the entire decade
before World War I. In four successive years (1924-27) the ratio of real res-
idential construction to real GNP reached by far its highest level of the52
3~ twentieth century.-- Hickman's simulations dramatize the extent to which
38/ The ratio was 8.6 percent in 1924-27 (Hickman-Coen, 1976,
Table A.2, p. 222). None of the postwar individual peak years of residential
construction spending (1950, 1955,1959, 1964, and 1972) came close to the
ratio of any of the four successive peak years of the 1920's (the ratios for
these postwar years are 6.2, 5.4, 5.3, 5.0, 5.3).
housing starts had risen in 1925 to a rate higher than was consistent with
current income, prices, and the rate of household formation. In the most
optimistic of his simulations, that which assumes that standardized household
growth continues at its 1924-25 rate, rather than declining, and that there is
no decline in income, predicted housing starts still fall bv 35 oercent between
1925 and 1930.
Combining the two effects, how much could housing have contributed to the
decline 1n income in the great contraction? Hickman's simulation which holds
income constant but allows standardized households to follow their actual growth
path generates a decline in housing starts between 1925 and 1930 of 49 percent,
amounting to about 4 percent of 1925 GNP. The impact of this deflationary force
on the economy was delayed by the buoyant behavior of consumption and inventory
accumulation in 1929, but when these components of spending collapsed in 1930,
the downward pressure on income from the housing sector interacted to aggravate
the severity of the contraction. Table 6 displays the ratios to real natural
output of the major components of real spending in 1926, 1929, and 1930.Table 6
RATIOS OF REAL SPENDING COMPONENTS
TO NATURAL REAL OUTPUT IN 1926, 1929, AND 1930
53
1926 1929 1930 Change, 1926-30
Consumption Expenditures 66.4 68.1 61.8 - 4.6
Nonresidential Fixed
Investment 13.0 12.9 10.3 - 2.7
Residential Fixed
Investment 8.6 5.1 3.0 - 5.6
Other 12.3 13.2 11.9 - 0.4
Total 100.3 99.3 87.0 -13.3
Sources: The natural output series (Q*) is from Gordon (1978, Appendix B).
1926 spending components are from Hickman-Coen (1976, Table A.2, p. 222).
1929 and 1930 spending data are in 1958 dollars, to retain comparability with
the Hickman-Coen data, from the Economic Report of the President (1968).
r,54
Consumption Expenditures
Table 5 indicates that several components of spending declined sharply
between 1929 and 1930, with the decline in consumption contributing the most
to the decline in real GNP. The behavior of consumption spending partly rep-
resents an endogenous reaction to the decline in other components of spending,
but in addition some portion of the consumption decline may reflect the in-
fluence of the stock market crash or may be an unexplained autonomous puzzle.
Unfortunately the recent debate between Temin (1976) and Mayer (1978a) does
little to elucidate the role of the stock market in explaining consumption.
By focussing on the significance in 1930 of residuals from consumption equa-
tions, both Temin and 'Mayer neglect to calculate the contribution of changes
in stock market wealth to the fitted value of consumption. Yet the timing of
the stock market boom and crash must partly explain why the level of consump-
tion spending was so high in 1929 and so low in 1930.
Taking the position that data inadequacies preclude estimation of an
interwar macro-econometric model, Mishkin (1977) has used coefficients from a
postwar model to assess the impact on consumption expenditures and residential
housing of changes in the household balance sheet in the 1930-41 period.
Wealth effects are potent enough to explain 45 percent of the decline in these
spending components in 1929-30. This is probably an overstatement of the true
impact of the exogenous component of the financial developments, because the
endogenous response of the financial variables to the decline in income is
neglected.
When the Hickman housing simulations and Mishkin calculations are combined,
we emerge with an explanation of several crucial features of the Depression.55
First, the housing collapse helps to explain both why the contraction was so
severe and why it lasted so long. As late as 1940 the ratio of housing to
natural output had. not regained even half of its level of the mid-1920's.
Real GNP in 1940 was able to exceed its absolute 1929 level through the con-
tribution of government pump-priming which filled in the gap left by the
3~ missing investment.-- Given the fact that M2 had risen 18 percent in 1940
relative to 1929, and that Ml had risen by 49 percent, a purely monetary ap-
proach cannot provide an explanation of the duration of the Depression.
The expanding role of government is evident in the following
comparison of ratios to actual real GNP in 1929 and 1940:
1929 1940 Change
Consumption Expenditures 68.5 67.1 - 1.4
Gross private domestic
investment 17.8 13.0 - 4.8
Net Exports 0.7 0.9 + 0.2
Government purchases 13.0 19.1 + 6.1
Second, the relation between the stock market and consumption spending
helps to explain why the initial 1927-29 collapse of construction did not in-
itiate the Depression earlier; the stock market bubble in 19~8-29 induced a
consumption boom which postponed the impact of the housing slump. The stock
market collapse precipitated a drastic decline in consumption spending which
interacted with and further aggravated the continuing decline in residential
construction. This interpretation makes the behavior of consumption at least56
partly a monetary phenomenon t to the extent that easy money helped boost
stock prices and that tight money helped bring on the crash. But no one has
ever claimed that the tripling of stock prices between the business-cycle
peaks of 1923 and 1929 could be more than partly explained by the 27 percent
increase in ~r2 over the same interval; a large residual portion of the behavior
of stock market prices must be classified as due to a speculative bubble which
at some point had to burst. In this sense the behavior of the stock market.
and its impact on consumption can be termed both autonomous and essentially
nonmonetary in origin t even if the precise timing of the stock market crash
may depend in part on the timing of monetary policy.
International Interactions
Meltzer (1976) has argued that American adherence to the rules of the gold-
exchange standard was a factor contributing to the initial decline in spending
in 1929. "A recession can be induced by the changes in [international] relative
prices that occurred in 1928 and 1929. A recession induced by changes of this
kind is a response to monetary policy if we include in monetary policy a com-
mitment to operate under the rules of the gold standard" (p. 458).
To the extent that the money stock is endogenous and responds negatively
to relative output advances. Meltzer has identified a little noticed. monetary
influence. Consider a domestic monetary expansion. As domestic output and
prices advance relative to outpUl and prices abroad. net exports decline. tem-
pering and possibly reversing the rise in output. Under the gold-exchange
standard rules t the decline in net exports would also result in a gold outflow
and subsequent fall in the money supply.57
However the evidence in favor of adherence to the principles of gold
standard during this period is extremely weak. Actually U.S. policy through
most of the 1920's was to sterilize gold flows. "From 1923 on, gold movements
were largely offset by movements in Federal Reserve credit so that there was
essentially ~ relation between the movements in gold and in the total of high
powered money; the fairly irregular dips and rises in the gold stock were
transformed into a horizontal movement in total high powered money." (Friedman
and Schwartz, 1963a, p. 382).
This policy of sterilization eliminates the link between gold and the
money supply central to Meltzer's hypothesis. Further refutation of Meltzer's
thesis that monetaTy policy should have been expected to lead to a recession
after the 1927-1928 recovery lies in the fact that the ratio of export to im-
port prices in the past had not always risen when U.S. output advanced relative
to that of its trading partners. Though an increase in U.S. relative to world
income was accompanied by an increase in U.S. relative prices in 1928-1929, this
was not the case in 1922-1923, when the price of U.S. exports fell over nine
40/ percent relative to the price of imports and U.S. output advanced re1ative1y.--
Between 1922 and 1923 U.S. real output grew 13.1 percent, com-
pared to 3.5 percent in the U.K., 8.2 in France, and 6.3 percent in Canada.
At the same time, the relative price of exports fell by 9.2 percent. The
Emergency Tariff Act of 1921 and the Fordney Tariff of 1922 prevented, in the
absence of perfectly elastic supply schedules, relative export prices from
falling further.58
Even with the deterioration of u.s. relative international prices at the
end of the 1920's, a demonstration of the impact of these price changes on net
exports is problematical. Hickman-Coen (1976) attempt to capture the effect
of relative price on imports over this era but cannot uncover any significant
effect when income and other factors are allowed for. More recently, Artus and
Sosa (1978) attempt to estimate these price elasticities for the 1963-1974
period. They conclude that these elasticities "are not extremely large and are
felt rather slowly" (p.46). In addition, real net exports barely changed be-
tween 1929 and 1930. Exports and imports declined together. If a relative
price change were responsible for causing the U.S. to export less and import
more, a deterioration in the trade balance should be observed. The absence of
any change in the real trade balance is an indication that some other factor
or combination of factors, both monetary and nonmonetary, was responsible for
the simultaneous reduction in income of the U.S. and its trading partners,
which in turn caused both exports and imports to decline together. The fact
that European nominal income fell less than that in the b.S., as indicated in
Figure 6, is consistent with the hypothesis that the depression spread from the
U.S. to Europe, but does not support any particular hypothesis about the effect
of relative prices on the trade ba1ance~/
If income elasticities for U.S. exports and imports were equal,
the smaller decline in European income should have led to a smaller decline in
U.s. exports, abstracting from relative price effects. The zero change in the
trade balance argues that relative price effects cut the trade balance. But
this result depends on equal income elasticities and would be invalidated by
a higher income elasticity for U.S. exports than imports.59
The most important qualification of all to Meltzer's hypothesis is that
a change in relative prices of a particular nation should have caused expend-
iture switching, not a worldwide depression. European output should have been
stimulated and U.S. output depressed, with aggregate world output left un-
4.2/ affected.-- The data show that income and output on both sides of the Atlantic
42/ In this era the economy of western Europe plus Canada was about
equal in size to that of the U.S •• The GNP in dollars of the subset of six
countries plotted in Figure 6 was 75 percent of U.S. GNP in 1929 (see "Notes
on Data").
fell together, a pattern consistent with causation from another factor.
Meltzer is on firmer ground when he blames another international factor,
the Hawley-Smoot tariff of June 1930, as responsible for converting "a size-
able recession into a severe depression" (p. 469). The tariff was responsible
for an increase of almost 50 percent in the effective rate of duties paid on
imports between 1929 and 1932. This aggravated the contraction through three
main channels.
(1) Directly, without any retaliation, the resulting increase in
the price of U.S. imports and close domestic substitutes altered the division
of the nominal income decline between output and prices in 1930-32, so that
output fell more than otherwise and prices fell less.
(2) Foreign retaliation reduced the demand for U.S. exports, which
aggravated the contraction through the standard Keynesian multiplier mechanism.
(3) Foreign retaliation against U.S. exports of food products, which
dropped 66 percent between 1929 and 1932 -(Meltzer, 1976, p. 460), aggravated60
the decline in U.S. farm prices, which was an important cause of rural bank
failures and in turn of the decline in the supply of money due to currency
hoarding.
Whether the impact on output and unemployment of the Hawley-Smoot
tariff was more or less important than that of housing and the stock market
is probably impossible to determine. The important point is that there was
more than one source, not just the behavior of the money supply but also
8~~eral nonmonetary factors, and that their effects interacted and amplified
the severity of the contraction. The role of the tariff, while not explicitly
involving the money supply, is nonetheless a factor which is consistent with
Plank 3 of the monetarist platform with its emphasis on the harmful effect of
government intervention, of which the tariff is a classic example.
Other international factors caused differences in the timing and mag-
nitude of the contraction in individual countries. The end of capital outflows
from the U.S. to Germany in 1928 helped cause an early downturn in that country.
In addition reparations "greatly intensified the German depression" (Haberler,
1976, p. 29). Then devaluations by Britain, Scandanavia, and other countries
in September, 1931 stimulated early recoveries there while deepening the slide
in the U.S. and Germany. The devaluation of the dollar in 1933-34 caused a
late trough in France and some other countries which had not devalued earlier.
IV. PRICES, OUTPUT, AND AGGREGATE SUPPLY
Equilibrium and Disequilibrium Approaches
Monetarists tend to rely on equilibrium aggregate supply (EAS) theories
to explain the division of nominal income between prices and quantities. These61
theories, embodied, for example, in the work of Friedman (1968), Lucas (1973),
and Sargent (1976) view changes in actual relative to the "natural" rate of
output as the response to deviations of actual from expected prices, which
cause a divergence of economic agents' expected and actual real wages.
Nonmonetarists, on the other hand, tend to discuss the same issue of
price and quantity determination in terms of a disequilibrium-adjustment frame-
work. In response to a demand shock, prices do not typically adjust rapidly
enough to clear markets, so agents find themselves constrained by a level of
sales or employment different from what they would voluntarily choose to de-
mand or supply at prevailing wages and prices (see Barro and Grossman, 1976,
Chapter 2). Under these circumstances, the demand for labor becomes a function
not only of the real wage, the capital stock, and technology, as in BAS theory,
but also of actual or expected output or sales. Nonmonetarists do not claim
that wages and prices are completely rigid, but rather assert that in the
short run wage and price adjustment to a situation of excess supply or demand
is partial rather than complete.
Empirical Explanations of Unemployment and the Output Ratio
Empirical tests of the BAS approach have been carried out by Lucas and
Rapping (1969) and more recently by Darby (1976b). Though Lucas and Rapping
examined the period from 1930 through 1965 and concluded that their model was
"consistent with the U.S. experience". in the ensuing debate with Rees (1972). they
admitted that their approach could not account for the failure of the unemploy-
ment rate to decline more rapidly after 1933.
In an attempt to resuscitate the BAS explanation of the 1930's, Darby62
has presented new unemployment data which treat government workers on eee
and WPA projects as employed rather than unemployed. Darby's corrected-data
are claimed to exhibit a strong movement toward the natural rate of unemploy-
ment in the post-1933 period.~/ Darby expresses the actual unemployment rate
43/ .
--- For a critique of Darby's redefinition of unemployment see Gordon
(1976, pp. 195-6) and Kesselman-Savin (1978).
at time t, Ut ' as a function of a constant, representing the natural rate of
unemployment, and the unanticipated component of the price level:
where ao is the natural rate of unemployment, Pt is the current level of the
implicit price deflator, and P~ is the expected level of the deflator. Darby
specifies the expected component of prices, P~, as being formed adaptively:
(6) P~ = APt + (I-A) P~-l
with Abeing the adjustment coefficient.44 /
44/ Actual and expected prices were assumed equal in 1924.
Table 7 replicates Darby's results using Lebergott's original unemploy-
ment rate series, U L, Darby's "corrected" version of that series, ~, and a
* measure of output relative to trend output, Q/Q. Each equation is estimated
using a maximum likelihood technique. The regression which minimizes the sum
of squared residuals over various values of the expectations parameter is listed
45/ in Table 7, along with the implied mean expectations adjustmentlag.--Table 7
Effect of "Price Surprises" on Output, 1930 - 1941
Mean Mean Expectations
Unanticipated Expectations Lag Constrained
Dependent Estimate Price Adjustment Lag Equal to 1 Year
Variable of V* Coefficient (in years) S.E.E. D.W. S.E.E. D.W.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
A. Annual Data
l. U L 0.059 -.716 00 .0123 2.22 .0453 0.52
(13.7) (-13.3)
2. U D 0.080 -.631 9.0 .0133 1.98 .0302 0.66
(14.2) (;'12~3)
3. Q/Q* 0.970 1.208 cD .0292 1.83 .0790 0.56
(46.4) ( 9.5)
B. Quarterly Data






The mean expectations adjustment lag is calculated as (l-"A)/"A.
The annual regressions in Section A indicate that regardless of the out-
put measure used, Darby's measure of unanticipated prices is correctly signed
and has a significant impact on output; for each of the output variants em-
ployed, the t-ratio on "price surprises" is very large. As in Darby's original
paper, the estimate of the natural rate of unemployment obtained with the ~
unemployment series is relatively high, around 8 percent. The natural rate
461 estimate obtained using the Lebergott data is 5.9 percent.- Section B con-
This may still be an overestimate since, even in the presence
of far more lucrative welfare and unemployment benefits in the 1970's, current
estimates of the natural rate hover around six percent. See Gordon (1977).
tains the results obtained when the output ratio version is reestimated using
quarterly data. The quarterly and annual regressions tell the same story, with
a strongly significant impact of price "surprises" on output, and an infinite
lag in the adjustment of expectations.iLl
47/
At the suggestion of Robert Lucas we conducted separate experi-
menta in which lagged dependent variables were added to each of the regressions
reported in Table 7. In each case the lagged variables were insignificant.65
Darby's adjustments to Lebergott's unemployment series sqarp1y alter
the profile of unemployment in the Great Depression, especially in the late
1930's. However, a comparison of lines A1 and A2 in Table 7 indicates that
the regression evidence in favor of the EAS hypothesis is no stronger using
the Darby data than when the original Lebergott data is used. In fact, the
natural rate estimate and the t-ratio on the price surprise variable are both
more favorable to the EAS theories in line A1. Thus, we cannot conclude that
the "corrected" data reveal that kind of consistency with the EAS framework
where none previously existed.
One disconcerting element in these test results is the extremely long
implied expectations formation lag. Column (3) indicates that only the Darby
unemployment rate regression has a finite mean lag, and that lag is nine
48/ years.-- The infinite adjustment lag estimated for the remaining regressions
481 This exceeds Darby's estimate of 5.7 years, presumably because
of our use of a slightly different price series prior to 1929. The methods and
other data series used here are identical to Darby's.
in Table 7 means that expected price level remains a constant equal to the
actual price level in 1924.
While it is true that prices in the 1920's exhibited little variance,
so that expectations of nearly constant prices like those implied by a nine
year mean lag seem credible, from 1929 through 1940 prices fell sharply, then
recovered appreciably. In every year during this 12 year stretch, agents over-
estimated the price change, whether the adjustment lag is nine years or infinite.66
These overestimates are both large and persistent. For instance, in 1931 with
the economy sliding further and further into depression, the estimated ex-
pected 1932 inf1atmon rate implied by a nine year lag is over 12 percent.
Actually 1932 brought 11 percent deflation. The question must be whether
these estimates can plausibly describe the behavior of rational economic agents.
We think not. And we suspect that many monetarists, particularly those who
stress the excess of real over nominal interest rates in 1931-33, would agree
(see Meltzer 1976).
Columns 6 and 7 of Table 7 present standard errors of the estimates
and Durbin-Watson statistics for the models described above under the restric-
49/ tion that the mean expectations adjustment lag is limited to one year.-- The
49/ This lag restriction is arbitrary but is much closer to postwar
estimates than a nine-year or infinite lag.
imposition of this restriction in each case substantially decreases the ex-
planatory power of the EAS hypothesis. The standard errors more than double
and the Durbin-Watson statistics indicate strong serial correlation in the
residuals, suggesting that Granger and Newbold's (1974) warning regarding the
possibly spurious nature of the entire relation cannot be disregarded.
Thus Darby's n~ unemployment data make a minimal contribution to the
case for the EAS framework. Unconstrained expectations estimates imply in-
credibly long, sometimes infinite, lags. Lag estimates restricted to a 1 year
mean revive problems of serious autocorrelation. The EAS theory cannot yet
account for the behavior of prices and output in the Great Depression in a67
manner consistent with the rational formation of expectations.
Explaining Price Change
If the EAS explanation cannot satisfactorily account for the behavior
of prices and output during the Great Depression, how adequate is the expecta-
tions-augmented Phillips Curve (EPC) favored in recent postwar econometric work.?
Table 8 presents the results of an attempt to determine whether the level or
change in either unemployment concept in Table 7 can explain the rate of change
of prices in annual data.
Contrary to the usual Phillips Curve relation between the level of the
unemployment rate and the rate of change of prices, Table 8 indicates that there
is no significant effect of the level of unemployment in ~quations which also
include the change in the unemployment rate. These equations and numerous
others not reported here demonstrate conclusively that the relation between
prices and unemployment (or the output ratio) in the interwar period links
levels of each variable or the rates of change of each. There is no evidence
of any empirical effect of the level of unemployment on the rate of change of
prices, as called for by the Phillips curve hypothesis. The EAS results in
Table 7 are completely consistent with this finding, of course, because an in-
finite adjustment lag causes equation (5) to be converted into a relation be-
tween the level of unemployment and the level of a price index with 1924 as
base:
(7)
The role of government intervention as a source of price and wage be-
50/ havior in the 1930's has been stressed by several recent authors.--Table 8
EFFECT OF THE LEBERGOTT AND DARBY tThTEMPLOYMENT
CONCEPTS ON THE RATE OF CHANGE OF PRICES IN
THE UNITED STATES, ANNUAL DATA, 1922-41
Coefficient of





Line Number Rates of Price Change t t t 1933 1934 1935 1936 S.E.E. D.W.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. 0.135 0.042 -0.951 --- --- ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.0237 2.51
(1.04) (0.59) (-6.67)
2. 0.203 --- -- -0.037 -0.921 ---- ----- ---- ---- 0.0265 2.50
(1.36) .(,...0.34) (-5.31)
3. 0.432 0.042 -0.957 ---- ----- 0.029 0.049 -'0.050 -0.035 0.0200 2.94
(3.05) (0.49) (-6.75) (1.03) (1.76) (-1.89) (-1.40)
4. 0.495 ---- ---- 0.069 -1.060 -0.001 0.029 -0.059 -0.053 0.0241 2.81
(2.73) (0.41) (-4.35)(-0.02) (0.78) (-1.64) (-1.66)
Note:
. L D ~L D
Additional variants yield the conc1usl0n that U l' U l' (U -U ) , and t- t- t






50/ See Gordon (1976), Darby (1976b), and Weinstein (1978).
One method of identifying such effects is to introduce dummy variables into
time-series regressions for years which external evidence identifies as
"special." For instance, we know that the NRA (the National Recovery Admin-
istration) was established in June, 1933 and abolished in May, 1935. Any
effects of the NRA on price behavior must therefore contaminate the annual-
average data for each year between 1933 and 1936. To allow for the possible
effect of the NRA, the equations in Table 8 have been re-estimated with the
addition of annual dummy variables for 1933-1936.
The results are interesting, particularly those presented in line 3.
The coefficients on the individual dummies for the years when the NRA operated
(1933 and 1934) are positive and are almost exactly counteracted by negative
coefficients for the years of the dismantling of the NRA after its enabling
legislation, The National Industrial Recovery Act, was declared unconstitutional
(1935 and 1936).51/ It appears that the addition of these annual dummy variables
The sum of the individual-years coefficients is -0.7 percent,
implying that whatever impetus the NRA gave to price and wage increases was com-
pletely reversed after the NRA was abolished. Since the NRA was both established
and declared unconstitutional in midyear, the significance of the NRA's initial
(1933) and terminal (1935) year coefficients are probably understated. An F ratio
on the joint significance of the 1933-!936 coefficients, which is probably simi-
larly understated, passes a significance test at the 10 percent level.70
fails to change the conclusion that the Darby unemployment variant (line 4
of Table 7) provides a relatively poorer explanation of price change in the
interwar period. The addition of the NRA dummies reduces the standard error
of the estimate, as compared with line 2, but the sum of the dummy variable
coefficients in that version is an implausible albeit insignificant -8.4 per-
cent.
Meltzer (1977) argues that "anticipations of inflation depend upon the
prevailing monetary standard" (p. 189), implying that empirical schemes which
approximate expectation formation with fixed coefficient functions of past in-
flation rates may provide poor estimates of rationally formed expectations
when the operation of the monetary system undergoes a basic alteration, as
when "the international gold standard ended after ••• 1931" (p. 190). In order
to test whether the relationship between the changes of prices and of output
is sensitive to the empirical method used to estimate expectations, we have
drawn upon Meltzer's method and estimated expectations as a function of lagged
money growth and lagged average money growth.52/ Regardless of whether ex-
Over the 1922-1941 period, agents choosing between
predictions of inflation based on lagged inflation rates or on measures of
lagged money growth would have been better off choosing the former.
2 The R 's
and standard errors of the two versions are 0.22 and 0.0455, and 0.24 and
0.0448, respectively, in equations explaining the annual rate of change of the
GNP deflator.
pectations of inflation are proxied by lagged inflation rates or are inde-
pendently estimated functions of lagged money growth, and regardless of71
whether or not separate annual dummies for 1933-1936 are included, and re-
gardless of whether the whole sample or various subsamples are examined, the
same result emerges: the rate of change of prices is signi'ficantly influ-
enced not by the level of output but only by its current rate of change.
The European Experience
While dummy variables provide a crude method to gauge the impact of
government intervention, another approach is to compare the division of nom-
inal income between price and output change in the U.S. and some other
countries or group of countries where government intervention was less i~
portant. This section compares the behavior of the U.S. with that of an
aggregate of six European countries.121 Without further research it is i~
121 The six European nations are the same as those identified in
footnote 29, and for which money and nominal income data is plotted in
Figure 6.
possible to determine whether any or all of these countries were completely
free of new government measures which interfered with the setting of prices;
the presumption here is that the degree of New Deal intervention in the 1933-
38 period represents an extreme case which might be identified by a comparison
541 with countries with less intervention.-
54/ The most important cases of intervention in Europe were the
German price and wage controls and the French Blum experiment.72
(footnote 54 continued)
Bry (1960) suggests that German price controls cause the official cost of
living index to be understated from 1937 on. Ka1ecki (1938) concludes that
the Blum experiment raised wages and wholesale prices by 60 percent in France
in 1937, without having any appreciable effect on real output. The upward
push on prices in France in 1937 thus to some extent offsets the German con-
tro1s which became tighter in 1936-38.
Figure 7 displays real output and the GNP deflator for the U.S. and
Europe during the period 1925-38. It is clear that the division of nominal
income change between price and output change was quite different in Europe.
Expressed on a 1929 base, the U.S. output index was lower than its price in-
dex in every year between 1930 and 1935, whereas the reverse was true in
Europe for every year of the 1930-38 period. On an annual basis only 45 per-
cent of the decline in U.S. nominal income during the 1929-33 contraction was
expressed as price change, whereas during the same interval the equivalent
figure for Europe was 73 percent~ Because the greater extent of price flexi-
bility in Europe was evident well before the advent of New Deal intervention
with the price system, it appears that some other factor must have been pri-
marily responsible for sluggish price adjustment in the U.S. One possibility
is the influence of the Hawley-Smoot tariff discussed above, although Meltzer's
analysis (1976) relies heavily on retaliation by foreign countries to explain
55/ how the tariff contributed to the severity of the U.S. contraction.--FIGURE 7. U.S. AND EUROPEAN PRICES AND REAL OUTPUT. 1925-194-1 (1929=1.0)









If retaliation had been complete and instantaneous, then the
tariff could make no contribution to the explanation of the greater degree of
price flexibility in Europe.
The difference between the U.S. and European aggregate supply response
is summarized in Table 9, which presents the same specification as Table 8 but
replaces the alternative unemployment variables by the ratio of output to a
trend (Q/Q*), in order to compensate for the lack of comparable unemployment data
for this period. The equations for Europe duplicate the U.S. result that the rate
of price change is a function of the rate of change of the Q/Q* level, not its
level. Further, in the European equations the coefficient on the rate of
change of Q/Q* is significantly higher than in the U.S., indicating that any
given change in nominal income was reflected more in the form of price change
56/ and less as quantity change in Europe than in the U.S.--
~/ The fraction of nominal income going into price change in the
short-run (given lagged prices) is equal to a/l+a, where a is the coefficient on
the rate of change of Q/Q* in Table 9. This fraction is 30 percent for the
U.S. on line A2 and 44 percent for Europe on line B2.
Since an identity links the rates of change of nominal income, the
price level, and real output, the equations in Table 9 can be reestimated in
a form which makes the rate of change of prices a function of the current rate
of change of nominal income and the lagged rate of change of prices. This
allows a direct comparison of the impact of the differences between the EuropeanTable 9
Effect of Output and Output Change on the Rate of Change of Prices





Sum of Two Lagged
Rates of Price Change * 9.&.
Rate of- ~aRge
of Q/Q S.E.E. D.W.
A. United States
1. 1922-41 0.156 0.031 ----- 0.0460 1.42 .
(0.61) (0.33)
2. 1922-41 0.016 ----- 0.423 0.0318 2.44
(0.09) (4.20)
B. Europe
1. 1928-38 0.380 0.195 ----- 0.0339 1.32
(0.56) (0.48) ....
2. 1928-38 0.467 ----- 0.794 0.0188 2.10 VI
(1.46) (4.08)
(t-ratios in parentheses)76
and the u.s. aggregate supply functions, holding constant the behavior of
nominal income. In Figure 8 are plotted the annual level of the U.S. im-
plicit GNP deflator CPt) and the fitted values of prices in two dynamic simu-
" lations. The first CPt) is based on coefficients from a regression of U.S.
price change on U.S. nominal income change and lagged price change. The second
CPt) is based on coefficients from a regression of European price change on
European nominal income change and lagged price change fitted to 1928-38.
Each simulation is calculated by multiplying these two alternative sets of
coefficients by the actual rate of change of U.S. nominal income and the
fitted values of lagged"U.S. price change.
Several interesting features of Figure 8 stand out prominently. First,
the impact of government intervention on the price level is evident in the
difference between Pt and Pt. The rise in actual Pt relative to the simulated
series in 1934 reflects the influence of NRA, and the subsequent slowness of
increase in Pt presumably reflects the demise of NRA in 1935. Even more notable
is the increase in Pt relative to Pt in 1937, caused"at least partly by the in-
fluence of unionization.iIl Further, the simulated P t series based on European
iI/ The ratio of union members to civilian employment more than
doubled between 1936 and 1938, and showed little change before 1937 or be-
tween 1938 and 1942.
coefficients indicate that, given actual U.S. nominal income behavior, the
U.s. price level would have declined by 33 rather than only 24 percent during











U.S. price level during 1933-37, often cited as evidence of cost-push, in-
stead appears to have been due to the very rapid growth of nominal income
during this interval. In fact; the simulated series Pt based on European co-
efficients and actual U.S. nominal income growth registers a 1933-37 increase
of 19.3 percent, greater than the 16.6 percent increase in the actual U.S.
deflator during the same period. ThMS if the degree of price flexibility in
the U.S. had been greater, U.S. prices would have rebounded even more in 1933-
37 than actually occurred.
V. CONCLUSION
Sources of Income Change
This paper has examined two different aspects of macroeconomic behavior
in the U.S. during the twelve-year period between 1929 and 1941, both the prox-
imate determinants of the severity and duration of the slump in nominal in-
come, and the factors influencing the division of those changes in nominal
income between changes in the price level and in real output. The first topic
involves the sources of shifts in aggregate demand, and the second concerns
the slope and source of shifts in the aggregate supply function. The link
which unifies attention to both issues in a single paper is their relation to
present-day monetarism. The preference of monetarists for monetary rules
rather than countercyclical activism is based on their assumptions thatpri-
vatespending is basically stable in the absence of government interference,
that government intervention does more harm than good, and that the price
mechanism provides a powerful self-correcting force which insulates the economy79
from long-lasting swings in real output in the absence of governm~nt activism.
The first question, the sources of nominal income movements, has been
the subject of much recent controversy and debate, but we are persuaded that
most of the heat has been unproductive. The common weakness of recent work
has been its polemical and unscientific attempt to demonstrate that a single
factor, the behavior of the money supply and monetary policy, either was
solely responsible for the great contraction of 1929-33 (Schwartz and Darby)
or played no role at all in the first two years of the contraction (Temin).
The inherent weakness of single-factor explanations, or of denials of the in-
fluence of particular factors, is that they can be so easily contradicted.
Schwartz and Darby must deny that any factor besides the 1928-29 deceleration
in monetary growth was responsible for the rapid collapse of spending in the
first quarters of the contraction. Temin must deny that a single deposit
holder at a bank which failed in 1930 or 1931 was forced to cut back his spend-
ing on current goods and services by as much as a single dollar! Because such
extreme positions fly in the face of common sense, we must register our sur-
prise that they are still so firmly maintained.
This paper concludes that both nonmonetary and monetary factors played
an important role in determining changes in nominal income during 1929-41. In
holding that there must have been multiple causes rather than a single cause, we
are only echoing a conclusion reached long ago by Haberler:
"Explanations which run in terms of one single cause have
been more and more discredited and should be regarded with
suspicion. The majority of modern writers on the subject
are careful to point out that a whole set of factors, and
perhaps not always the same combination of factors, con-80
tribute towards producing an alternation of prosperity
and depression (Haber1er, 1958, pp. 5~6).
Four views ranging from extreme monetarism (A) to extreme nonmonetarism (D)
were initially distinguished. Evidence has been presented which rejects both
views (A) and (D), leaving the intermediate soft-line monetarist and non-
monetarist views (B) and (C) as plausible explanations which differ only in
emphasis.
View (B) essentially states that, while nonmonetary factors may partially
have initiated the 1929-33 contraction, it was the failure of the Federal
Reserve to offset the deflationary impact of bank failures which converted a
serious recession into a severe depression. View (C) emphasizes the nature
of the nonmonetary factors which played an important role in 1929-33 without
denying that a 1countercyc1ical stimulus applied by the Federal Reserve could
have lessened the severity and duration of the contraction. The difference
between views (B) and (C) is inconsequential, representing mainly the greater
interest of nommonetarists in the 1929-31 phase of the contraction and of mon-
etarists in the 1931-33 phase, and the two views are in fact almost perfectly
58/ complementary, each filling in the gaps left in the other's analysis.--
58/ Mayer (l978b) and others comment on the notable lack of attention
to the nature of the 1929-30 phase of the contraction by Friedman-Schwartz.
Weaknesses in a Purely Monetary Explanation
The present paper contains new evidence which rejects a monocausal
monetary explanation of the first two years of the contraction. Simulations
based on the average relation between lagged values of the money supply and81
current values of nominal income in the 1920-28 interval suggest that the
deceleration in monetary growth beginning in early 1929 cannot explain why
the initial contraction of income was so severe. The initial slowdown of
monetary growth in 1928-29 was no greater than in previous minor recessions
in 1920's, leaving unanswered the question as to why nominal income should
have dropped by almost 30 percent during the first two years of the con-
traction.
The statistical relationship between lagged money and income is
sufficiently weak, even in the 1920's, as to raise serious questions about the
ability of changes in the money supply and monetary policy to explain changes
in nominal income during the interwar period. While an F ratio on the joint
contribution of the lagged money variables is significant in the 1920-28 period
when the variables are expressed as growth rates, the F ratio is insignificant
for the level form of the variables. The t-ratios on the sum of the lagged
money coefficients are insignificant in every period and for every variant
of the equations. 4nG questions may be raised as to whether a significant
lead of money before income would have any meaning even if it could be found;
some nonmonetarists might claim that money supply swings re1ect changes in the
need of businessmen to finance inventory changes, and that swings in these
working capital needs could precede business cycle turning points.
As the sample period of the income-on-1agged-money regressions is ex-
tended into the 1930's, the coefficients on lagged monetary change become even
weaker. After 1929 the relationship between money and income appears to be en-
tirely contemporaneous, adding plausibility to the reverse feedback hypothesis
that the reflex influence of business on money was a primary determinant of
money supply swings during 1929-41. In light of postwar time-series evidence82
indicating that swings in monetary growth induced by policy shifts require
several quarters to influence income growth, it appears dubious that the purely
contemporaneous relation of the 1930's could mainly reflect a money-to-income
chain of causation.
Not only is a statistical relation between lagged money and income non-
existent after 1929, but in addition a purely monetary explanation cannot ex-
plain the duration of the slump of nominal income in the 1930's. The money
supply grew very rapidly between 1938 and 1940, and in 1940 exceeded its 1929
average by almost 20 percent, yet income grew at a sluggish pace during 1938-
40 and in 1940 was still below its 1929 level.
A purely monetary explanation leaves unanswered why nominal income fell
so rapidly during 1929-31, why income grew so slowly during 1938-40 and so
rapidly during 1940~41, and why the relation between money and income in the
1930's should have been contemporaneous without the long lags which monetarists
have emphasized in their critiques of policy activism. Yet nonmonetary ex-
planations are available for each of these features of the period.
The first nonmonetary source of the 1929-31 contraction in income was
the decline in residential housing construction, due both to a decline in
population growth following the 1921 and 1924 legislation limiting immigration,
and to overbuilding during the mid-1920's. The decline in housing began in
1927 and became very steep in 1928 and 1929, and yet its impact on the aggre-
gate economy was delayed by a tenlporary boom in consumption (and to some extent
in nonresidential investment) stimulated by the speculative stock market
bubble. The collapse in stock values brought about a rapid decline in con-
sumption spending which added to and interacted with the impact of the housing
slump. After the summer of 1930 the Hawley-Smoot tariff added to the83
contractionary pressure.
The timing of income change in the late 1930's also requires a mainly
nonmonetary explanation. While money-supply growth was rapid and relatively
steady between early 1938 and late 1941, nominal income grew slowly through
mid-1940 and rapidly thereafter. Nonmonetarists point to the sluggishness
of investment demand during 1938-40, and the enormous increase in defense
spending in 1940-41, as an obvious explanation of this timing pattern. And,
in light of the weak relation between money and income in 1938-41, they would
suggest that at least part of the simultaneous decline in money and income
during 1937-38 reflects not the influence of an exogenous monetary policy
shift, but rather the reverse feedback effect of income on money following a
very marked contractionary swing toward a full-employment fiscal surplus during
1936-37.
Weaknesses in a Purely Nonmonetary Explanation
There is no contradiction between the statements that (1) in the absence
of a strong countercyclical monetary policy the money-income relation in the
1930's was dominated by a contemporaneous feedback effect of income on money,
and (2) an alternative activist monetary policy would have yielded a different
set of data exhibiting a significant impact of lagged money on income. Non-
monetarists may rightly claim that given the absence of monetary activism,
nonmonetary factors were mainly responsible for the collapse in both money and
income in 1929-33, but they thereby provide no proof that such activism could
not have been effective.
Since the U.S. data are incapable of revealing the effects of behavior84
which did not occur, monetarists make a valuable contribution by pointing to
the differences between European and U.S. behavior. The similarity in the
behavior of velocity in Europe and the U.S. during the decade of the 1930's
supports the monetarist conjecture that, had the U.S. followed Europe in pre-
venting a collapse of the money supply, U.S. nominal income would have ex-
hibited the milder contraction and earlier recovery actually observed in ~urope.
Monetarists might also claim that the weakness of the effects of money-
supply growth in 1938-40 could have been a consequence of earlier monetary
inaction. As Hawtrey (1933) pointed out, once a depression has occurred and
business expectations have become dominated by pessimism, a monetary expansion
may not have the same simulating effect which would have occurred earlier, and a
a combined monetary and fiscal expansion may instead be necessary to bring
about a full recovery. It was such an expansion in 1940-41, of course, which
finally brought the depression to an end in the U.S.
Finally, the primary role of nonmonetary forces in explaining the in-
itial phase of the 1929-33 contraction, and the inability of the small decel-
eration in nometary growth to explain why the contraction was so severe, may
be admitted winhout precluding a role for money in determining the timing of
the 1929 turning point. Without easy money in 1927~28 and tight money in early
1929, the stock market and consumption boom and collapse might have been dampened,
and the course of nominal income might have more directly followed the path of
the ongoing slump in housing investment.
The Aggregate Supply Response
Neither the equilibrium aggregate supply (RAS) approach nor the85
expectationa1 Phillips Curve (EPC) appear at all adequate as explanations of
the division of U.S. nominal income changes between price and output changes
in the 1930's. Deviations of unemployment or output from their natural levels,
according to EAS, occur only when economic agents are surprised by the emer-
gence of a price level different from that which they previously expected.
While the EAS approach provides a plausible explanation of 1929-33, it cannot
explain why output remained so low and unemployment so high during 1933-40.
Price movements were sufficiently modest after 1934 as to make surprises small
by any reasonable version of how agents formed expectations; the computer is
f~rced to conclude that an EAS econometric specification can explain unemploy-
ment and output in the late 1930's only if it is implausibly assumed that agents
each year expected the price level to return to its 1924 value in the face of
continuing evidence that no such return was occurring!
The EPC approach fails completely as well, because there is no evidence
at all of a relation between price change and the level of unemployment or out-
put during the 1930's, either for the U.s. or an aggregate of six European
countries. The statistical relation appears to have been between price change
and output change, or between the level of prices and the level of output.
These results lead to an interesting set of research questions to be explored
in subsequent work. The finding that price change responds to output change
but not the level of output is consistent with Meltzer's (1977) development of
a price-specie-flow model of an economy operating under the gold standard.
Changes in demand cause simultaneous changes in both output and prices, but the
emergence of unemployment and an output gap is anticipated and has no inde-
pendent effect on the rate of price change, as required in the EPC approach.59/
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Why the EPe appears to describe the postwar years but not the interwar years
is attributed by Meltzer to the shift from the gold to the dollar standard,
although Gordon's recent work on the postwar (1977) suggests that even re-
cently the dominant explanation of the rate of price change is the rate of
change of the output gap rather than its 1eve1.59/
Our research here supports Meltzer's in linking the rate of
change of prices and the rate of change of output, but conflicts with his in
finding no conclusive evidence that price expectations were based on the recent
behavior of monetary growth. Instead, we find that price change is better
predicted by past price change than past monetary change, and that the money-
to-prices link was particularly weak in 1937-40 (In 1940 the GNP deflator was
below its 1937 value, despite the 20 percent growth in M2 and 30 percent growth
in M1 which occurred during that interval). In part our differences with
Meltzer may reflect the fact that Meltzer actually fits no equations which in-
clude only the interwar period. In his regressions for 1901-1940, any looseness
of the money-to-prices relation in 1937-40 must be dominated by the high variance
of both money and prices during the World War I period, 1916-20.
Because the high level of unemployment had no independent effect on prices
in the 1930's, the monetarist belief in the recuperative self-correcting powers
of the private economy receives no support from the data. Some monetarist
writings have stressed the role of government intervention as a source of cost-
push pressure in the 1930's, but our results lead us to discount any crucial role
for government in explaining the puzzles of U.S. aggregate supply behavior during87
that decade. With the exception of a temporary upward blip in prices in
1934, which vanished in 1935, and of a high rate of price increase in 1937,
the year of greatest unionization, we find that a simple relation between
price change, output change, and lagged price change fits the interwar data
for both the U.S. and Europe quite well. Because Europe has much less price-
raising intervention than the U.S. but exhibits the same type of supply
response, doubt is cast on intervention as the main cause of U.S. behavior.
The main difference between the U.S. and Europe, the steeper slope of the
European supply function, was evident in 1929-33, well before the advent of
the New Deal. The sources of sluggishness in U.S. price behavior prior to
1933 must stand high on an agenda of future research topics, with an initial
avenue of investigation being an attempt to quantify the role of the Hawley-
Smoot tariff of 1930.
A Final Scorecard
In concluding that nonmonetary explanations are essential in a complete
explanation of the magnitude and timing of income movements in the 1930's, we
deny the validity of Plank 1 of the monetarist platform with its emphasis on
the inherent stability of private spending. But in agreeing with the basic
Friedman-Schwartz proposition that a different policy response would have re-
ducing the severity and duration of the great contraction, and in pointing to
the harmful role of the Hawley-Smoot tariff, we lend our support to the message
of Plank 3 that past government policy actions (and in 1929-33 the absence of
appropriate policy actions) have done more harm than good. Finally, while
denying any potency for the self-correcting mechanism of price flexibility88
during the 1930's, as stressed in Planks 2 and 4, we must add that the under-
lying sources of aggregate supply behavior in the U.S. during the interwar
period, and the reasons for changes in this behavior between the nineteenth
century and the 1930's, and between the 1930's and the present day, must stand
high on any agenda of unsolved research puzzles in macroeconomics.89
Notes on Data
1919-1941
IPC: Index of nominal value of industrial production. CAlculated as the
index of industrial production (Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues)
times the CPI (BLS).
M Money.
United States: Friedman and Schwartz (1963a), Appendix A.
Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom):
Mitchell (1975, pp. 676-683).
P Implicit price def1ato~.
United States: Annual. 1919-1921: Kuznets (1941). 1922-!928: Hickaan
and Coen (1976). 1929-1941: Department of Commerce (1976).
Quarterly. Generated using the Chow-Lin (1971) technique which dis-
tributes annual series into quarterly series using related, quarterly
series. The related series used were the CPI and the WPI.
Europe (except France): Mitchell (1975, pp. 785-790). Calculated
as the quotient of current dollar divided by constant dollar gross
national product.
France: The German implicit price deflator was regressed on the German
WPI, both in logs. The resuJting coefficients were then multiplied
by the French WPI to obtain nn estimate of the French implicit price
deflator. French and German WPI data series are from Mitchell (1975).
Q Real output.
United States: Annual. 1919-1921: Kuznets (1941). 1922-1928: Hickman
and Coen (1976). 1929-1941: Department of Commerce (1976).90
Quarterly. Three related series, industrial production, real department
store sales, and a linear trend were employed to generate quarterly
real output using the Chow-Lin (1971) technique. See P.
Europe: Mitchell (1975, pp. 785-590). The aggregate for Europe is the
sum of real GNP for the six European countries converted into dollars
using 1929 exchange rates.
(* Natural rate of output. 1913-1929: Calculated as the exponential trend
between the real GNP levels of 1913 and 1929. 1930-1941: Calculated
as the extrapolation of the 1913-1929 annual trend rate of growth of
2.54 percent using the actual rate of output in 1929 as the natural
rate of output in 1929.
S Index of department store sales (Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues).
UD Unemployment rate. Darby (1976b).
UL Unemployment rate. Lebergott (1964).
Y Nominal GNP.
United States: P multiplied by Q.
Europe: Mitchell (1975, pp. 785-790). The aggregate for Europe is the
sum of nominal GNP for the six European countries converted into dol-
lars using 1929 exchange rates.REFERENCES 91
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